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Foreign aid to strengthen civil society in developing democracies has become 
increasingly popular as a means to affect political change. Despite the significant financial 
resources that are being dedicated to this field, much debate remains concerning the impact of 
foreign aid on civil society and democratization in general. 
This study begins to address this lack of information by looking specifically at foreign 
donor involvement to civil society as it has affected the transition and consolidation of multi-
racial democracy in South Africa. This goal was accomplished by first examining overall 
foreign donor involvement in funding civil society during and after apartheid. After outlining 
foreign-funded civil society in South Africa as a whole, this study looked in-depth at one 
governmental donor (the U.S. Agency for International Development) and one non-
governmental donor (the C.S. Mott Foundation) to gain an understanding of the goals and 
motivations civil society donors in South Africa are working toward, as well as to analyze 
funding trends exhibited through grants disbursed since South Africa's transition to 
democracy in 1994. 
This study collected data from annual reports, past research studies, and personal 
interviews, as well as self-analyzed data aggregated from grant records. With the data, this 
study found South African civil society to be robust, diverse, and highly involved with 
foreign donors, partially as a result of the legacy left on the sector by apartheid politics. 
Both public and private donors have played a significant role in funding civil society 
in South Africa during and after apartheid. While both donors studied had the same overall 
goal in funding civil society in South Africa - to help usher in and consolidate a multi-racial, 
democratic South African state, each focused on different sub-goals. The Mott Foundation, 
for instance, concentrated a great deal on citizen participation in democratic processes, while 
USAID concentrated more intensely on government processes of democracy. 
Each donor employed different methods and strategies in their civil society funding. 
While during apartheid both donors personally funded local civil society groups, soon after 
the transition to democracy USAID shifted its strategy, with more money going through 
intermediaries to South African government institutions. The Mott Foundation actually 
increased its funding to civil society strengthening efforts in the years since the end of 
apartheid. 
Despite these differences, both donors tended to fund professional, urban-based civil 











working specifically toward democracy or non-profit strengthening activities. Very little 
funding went to small, rural, community-based organizations from either donors. As such, 
these groups encouraged the development of a South African civil society in line with Larry 
Diamond's theory of a politically orientated, pluralistic civil society as the key to 
consolidating democracy, as opposed to a Robert Putnam-influenced theory based on social 
capital as the key to civil society's democratic importance. 
Civil society funding continues to flourish as donors increasingly regard civil society 
as necessary to the overall development of democracy. Additional studies are needed to fully 












AN EXAMINATION OF FOREIGN-FUNDED CIVIL SOCIETY 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Civil Society Funding Examined 
Since the early 1980s, democracy aid has become an increasingly popular means through 
which foreign governments endeavor to affect change in the developing world. Civil society 
development has been the object of a particularly strong focus from a wide range of donors. 
Bilateral aid agencies, multilateral organizations, private foundations, and others have poured 
millions of dollars into democracy aid and civil society. Civil society support has been a focus of a 
variety of donors throughout the world, including both government donors (bilateral and 
multilateral aid agencies) and private donors (foundations and grantmakers). While these two types 
of donors have demonstrated varying goals and strategies, together they have poured millions of 
dollars into civil society strengthening programs with the expectation that this aid will help recipient 
countries in the process of democratization. Several studies have supported this claim. Most 
recently, a quantitative study of USAID's worldwide democracy assistance program found 
"consistent and clear positive impacts" of foreign aid on democratization. l 
Yet, some critics argue that aid to civil society does not promote the transition or 
consolidation of democracy. Indeed, civil society assistance has come under increasing attack by 
the very developing democracies that receive such aid. Foreign-funded civil society groups have 
faced increasing difficulties throughout the world - from Ethiopia and Zimbabwe to Kazakstan and 
Venezuela. Russian law now requires non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the country to 
inform the government of every project they plan to carry out? Things are arguably worst in 
Belarus, where all political or educational activities have been banned from accepting international 
funding. 3 
South African civil society has not been spared from government criticism. Government 
officials and political parties have been increasingly vocal in their opposition to the foreign funding 
of civil society groups. In 1997, then-President Nelson Mandela gave a speech to the African 
National Congress' 50th National Conference, where he attacked foreign-backed civil society and 
accused sectors of the NGO community of lacking legitimacy from among the South African 
1 Steven E Finkel, Anibal Perez-Linan. and Mitchell A. Seligson. "Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy 
Building: Results of a Cross-National Quantitative Study," U.S. Agencvfor International Development, 12 January 
2006. 
<http://www.usaid.£ov!our work/cit:mocracy and governance/publicatiuns/pdfslimpact of democracy assistance.pdf> 
(25 April 2006), 1. 












people. In his speech he charged these NGOs with acting as "instruments of foreign governments 
and institutions that fund them," charging them with undermining the legitimacy of the elected 
state.4 Current President Thabo Mbeki has fueled this debate by publicly questioning foreign 
donors' roles in the manipulation of South African civil society. 
Issues Addressed 
Despite the increasingly public debate about aid to civil society, we know little about its 
actual impact on government or democracy overall. To begin an inquiry of this topic, the basic data 
to assess these questions must be compiled. Such data would include a descriptive picture of the 
recipients of this funding; the scope and purposes of civil society foreign aid; and the donors' 
motivations and goals in granting civil society aid. This study will begin to explore these questions 
by focusing on foreign assistance to South Africa throughout apartheid and the transition to 
democracy. 
The findings of this research will be helpful to understand the evolution of foreign funding 
to South African civil society and the current strategies that foreign donors employ. Importantly, 
these findings will be useful as a basis for more comprehensive studies on the role civil social aid 
plays on democratization in general. More practically, this study will be useful as a tool for both 
donors and aid recipients. Donors can use this information to better plan and coordinate efforts to 
build a more robust civil society. Aid-recipient countries can also use this information to better 
understand the scope and breadth of foreign aid to civil society and begin to explore the role of this 
aid in developing democracy. 
This study addresses the broad questions: What is the extent of foreign donor efforts on 
South African civil society? What funding strategies have donors followed in their civil society aid 
to South Africa over that time? A completely systematic and exhaustive study would enumerate all 
donors, all grants, and either analyze the complete list or select a representative sample to analyze. 
However, the scope of this study does not allow a complete census of all donors and grants, and 
without a census it is not possible to choose a random sample. Instead, two specific donors were 
examined: the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Mott 
Foundation. 
These donors were selected because of their long history of involvement in funding civil 
society in South Africa, the highly developed nature of their civil society program in the country, 
and the overall size of their program. More specifically, USAID was selected as it is the largest 
bilateral donor to South Africa, as well as the largest donor to democracy and governance in the 
4 Nelson Mandela. 1997. Report by the President of the ANC to the 5(/h Natinoal Conference of the African National 












country. Civil society initiatives have been funded by USAID's South Africa Mission during 
apartheid and throughout the transition and consolidation process. USAID was examined primarily 
as a case study to understand the goals and rationale of a government donor to South African civil 
society. Similarly, the Mott Foundation has a relatively large and highly developed civil society 
funding program that has operated in South Africa for roughly the same time period. The Mott 
Foundation was examined primarily to understand funding trends of a private donor to South 
African civil society development. Moreover, as Mott and USAID are both U.S.-based donors, any 
differences in their funding strategies would not have resulted from cultural differences owing to 
their origin country. 
Research Outline 
This study attempts to provide a thorough overview of South African civil society both 
during and after apartheid, with special emphasis on the foreign funding environment. This is 
achieved through both a general overview and an in-depth look at two specific donors to South 
African civil society. As civil society is a broad concept, it can be interpreted in various ways by 
different donors. For the purposes of this study, civil society is defined generally as one of three 
realms of society - along with the government and the business (or for-profit) realms - that consists 
of autonomous and voluntary organizations. When looking at specific donor case studies, however, 
this paper uses the donor's own definition of civil society to determine the nature and purpose of 
grants funded. 
Chapter one exammes the relationship between foreign aid, democratization, and civil 
society. First, the rise in democracy assistance and debates around its effectiveness is evaluated. 
Next, this chapter looks at civil society's role in democratic development and foreign funding. 
Finally, it outlines debates about foreign-funded civil society in developing democracies. 
Next, chapter two looks specifically at civil society in South Africa. It provides an overview 
of the sector both during and after apartheid - the types of groups developed, the issues addressed, 
and the size of the sector overall. This chapter also identifies challenges South African civil society 
has faced and is currently facing in its efforts to encourage the development of a multi-racial 
democracy. 
Chapter three looks at the donor aspect of South Africa's democratic development. It 
outlines patterns in overall aid and civil society funding in particular. It also examines differences 
in strategy and goals of public (governmental) donors and private (non-governmental) donors. 
Chapter four looks at a case study of one public donor to South Africa - the United States 











donor involvement in South Africa from the 1980s until the present. The Agency will be evaluated 
to determine its goals and rationale in funding civil society initiatives throughout the period. 
Finally, chapter five looks at a case study of one private donor to South Africa - the Mott 
Foundation. This chapter first reviews the Foundation's civil society program and its involvement 
in South Africa throughout the years. It then analyzes all grants awarded during the period between 
1994 and 2005 to grasp an understanding of the scope, diversity, and nature of the Mott 
Foundation's civil society program since the end of apartheid. Finally, it matches the profile of 
these grants to the Foundation's stated goals for the program. 
Conclusion 
In the past quarter of a century, the number of democratic countries in the world has rapidly 
increased. With the addition of so many new democracies, there has been a subsequent increase in 
the amount of democracy assistance flowing from the Western democracies to developing countries 
in the former Soviet Union, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. As civil 
society'S critical role in the transition to democracy became clearer, civil society development 
received more attention as a specific goal within democracy assistance. 
Despite this increased focus on civil society and democracy development, relatively little 
has been written with which to gauge the success of foreign assistance in developing civil society, 
or even civil society'S successes in aiding the consolidation of democracy. By surveying the 
foreign-funded civil society environment in South Africa in particular, this study will illuminate 












FOREIGN AID, DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
Official bilateral donors gave US$106.5 billion in foreign aid in 2005.5 The U.S. 
government alone earmarked US$27.5 billion for international development purposes that 
year. In 2003, foreign aid made up an average of 6 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa's Gross 
National Income.6 For some developing countries, the vast majority of central government 
expenditures come from development aid.7 Foreign aid is no doubt playing an increasingly 
important role in international politics, particularly for countries in the global south. Since 
the end of the Cold War, a new form of foreign aid - democracy assistance - has become a 
sizable part of international donor support to developing countries. 
This chapter will introduce democracy assistance and civil society strengthening as a 
growing goal of foreign aid. Despite some debate over the success and definition of these 
goals, Western donors are increasingly utilizing political aid to affect the development of 
emerging democracies around the globe, often to the chagrin of politicians in aid-recipient 
countries. 
The Rise of Democracy Assistance 
As the scope of foreign aid has increased in recent decades, so too has a specific type 
of foreign aid - democracy assistance. For the past quarter of a century, donors have 
increasingly gravitated toward democracy assistance as a means to affect political change. 
Democracy assistance refers to support, primarily financial, that is provided with the aim of 
strengthening democratic practices and good governance. This is achieved by promoting: 
free and fair elections, the development of strong political institutions, citizen participation 
and oversight, and bureaucratic accountability, among other activities. Governments, 
multilateral organizations, and independent foundations have dedicated millions of dollars to 
supporting the transition and consolidation of new democracies throughout the world. The 
U.S. government alone increased its democracy assistance from US$109 million in 1990 to 
:; OEeD. "Aid Flows top USD 100 billion in 2005" Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
4 April 2006,. <http://www.oecd.org/docllment/4010.2340,en 2649 34447 36418344 1 1 I 1.00.html> (10 
May 2006). 
6 World Bank. "2005 World Development Indicators: Aid dependency" The World Bank Group. 2006, 
<http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdipdfs/tabIc6 I O.pdb (17 June 2006). 
7 For example, according to the World Bank, in 2003, foreign aid made up 53.7% of government expenditures in 
Armenia, 40.8% in Bolivia, 630/c in Mongolia 63%, and a whopping 95.8% in Nicaragua (World Bank 2005 











US$830 million in 2003.8 Democracy assistance has not only become an important part of 
development aid, but also an important part of international relations in genera1.9 
Democracy assistance became a funding priority in the 1980s and 1990s as bilateral'o 
and multilateral" donors began to shift their aid priorities. With the rise of authoritarian 
regimes in Southeast Asia, Central America, and Southern Africa, as well as other nationalist 
victories in the South, "democracy promotion" began to gain support as a useful strategy for 
influencing international politics.'2 Moreover, as democracy began to spread throughout 
Africa, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union, the more established democracies 
amplified their financial support purporting democracy as the ideal political system, with the 
belief that democracies make better political and economic allies. '3 
The end of the Cold War helped precipitate this increase III democracy assistance 
worldwide. Before 1990, development aid was often linked to security goals and many aid 
agencies shied away from supporting overtly political work. The Cold War completion not 
only created democratic openings in a new wave of countries, but also made the idea of 
external political aid more palpable. 14 
This expansion of democracy assistance is also a function of the growing belief by 
development organizations that aid to other sectors (economic growth, education, public 
health, gender equality, etc) is ineffective in the absence of a democratic state. Several 
studies have shown that the presence of democracy and good governance within a country is 
more likely to lead to economic and social development.'s A 2000 report concluded that: 
Democratization and good governance are central to the achievement of development 
goals. Thus, [for] poverty reduction, promoting gender equality, raising basic 
8 Steven E Finkel, Anibal Perez-Linan, and Mitchell A. Seligson. "Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on 
Democracy Building: Results of a Cross-National Quantitative Study," U.S. Agency for International 
Development, 12 January 2006. 
<http://www.usaid.!!ov/ollr work/democracy and governanccipuhlications/pdfslimpact of democracy assistan 
ce.pdf> (25 April 2006), 26. 
9 Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, eds. 2000. Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy 
Promotion. Washington. DC: Brookings Institution Press., 5. 
10 Bilateral aid comes from a single government agency, such as USAID in the United States and DFID in the 
United Kingdom. 
II Multilateral aid comes from an organization that receives funds from a variety of governments, such as the 
United Nations or the World Bank. 
12 Julie Hearn, "Aiding democracy? Donors and civil society in South Africa." Third World Quarterlv, 21 :5, 
2000,815 
13 Ottaway and Carothers,S. 
14 Ibid., 5-6. 
15 Glenda White, Chris Heymans, Merle Favis, and Jeets Hargovan. "Development Co-operation Report: 
Evaluation of IDA to DEMOCRACY and GOOD GOVERNANCE," International Organisation Development, 











education and health standards and reversing environmental degradation - the 
emergence of more participatory, transparent and accountable societies is essential. 16 
Democracy promotion gained importance as aid agencies began seeing democracy not only 
as a goal to strive for in itself, but also as a necessary component to achieve other economic 
and social development goals. 
Democracy Assistance Debated 
Despite the rise of democracy assistance by bilateral, multilateral, and private donors 
worldwide, a debate persists about the effectiveness of this political aid. Studies examining 
the link between foreign aid and democracy promotion coupled with good governance point 
to the conclusion that democracy aid programs do work. However, these findings are not 
universally accepted, and there is no shortage of ardent critics offering contrary arguments. 
Many practitioners and academics have been vocal in their support of democracy 
assistance. Larry Diamond, founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy, for instance, 
argues that democratic governments such as the United States should support the opening of 
previously authoritarian regimes through political, financial, and diplomatic support. This 
support can help create a more democratic, and therefore more stable, world because: 
Democratic countries do not go to war with one another or sponsor terrorism against other 
democracies. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to threaten one another. 
Democratic counties are more reliable, open, and enduring trading partners, and offer 
more stable climates for investment. Because they must answer to their own citizens, 
democracies are more environmentally responsible. They are more likely to honor 
international treaties and value legal obligations since their openness makes it much more 
difficult to breach them in secret. Precisely because they respect civil liberties, rights of 
property, and the rule of law within their own borders, democracies are the only reliable 
foundation on which to build a new world order of security and prosperity. 17 
A recent study by academics Steve Finkel, Anibal Perez-Linan, and Mitchell Seligson has 
empirically supported the effectiveness of democracy assistance by the United States. This 
study measured the effects of democracy spending by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) on democratization since the end of the Cold War. The 
researchers statistically found "consistent and clear positive impacts" of foreign democracy 
assistance. 18 More specifically, the study concluded that: "Spending on the promotion of 
democracy, in the period 1990-2003, helped to increase democracy above the levels that 
16 Ibid., IS. 
17 Larry Diamond. "Promoting democracy," Foreign Policy Magazine, 87 (Summer 1992): 25-46. 











would have been achieved based on all other factors that could reasonably be expected to 
have mattered." 19 
Other studies, however, have found the impact of foreign aid on democratization levels to 
be less clear. Stephen Knack, for example, found no evidence that aid either promoted or 
undermined democracy.20 He found that the number of aid recipient countries with improved 
democracy ratings was indeed much higher than those whose democracy scores dropped, 
using both Freedom House and Polity measurements, but concluded that little of this progress 
can be attributed to foreign aid. 21 Despite this finding, he did not conclude that democracy-
building aid is ineffective, but rather argued that "successful programs appear to be either too 
few and far between for their effects to be detectable in the aggregated data.,,22 
Other researchers argue strongly that aid is ineffective. A 1999 study by Thomas 
Carothers, for instance, concluded that "using several alternative democracy indexes and 
measures of aid intensity, no evidence is found that aid promotes democracy.,,23 Despite 
these critics, democracy promotion continues to be an important goal of public and private 
donors around the globe, and as such deserves continued research attention. 
Civil Society and Democracy Assistance 
Within democracy assistance programs, civil society support has been a particularly 
popular means of promoting democracy among foreign donors. While strengthening civil 
society has long been associated with democracy promotion, in recent years "civil society" 
has become almost synonymous with democratization and good governance. Civil society 
aid has gained prominence in all the major bilateral donors and private foundations in the 
United States, Europe, and Japan.24 A look at the increase in aid funds spent to promote civil 
society in developing countries illustrates the increasing belief in the relationship between 
civil society and democratization. By the mid-1990s over US$4 billion was being spent to 
develop strong civil societies. In just seven years, USAID alone saw a 325 percent increase 
IY Ibid .. 3. 
211 Stephen Knack. "Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?" Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal 
Sector. Working Paper no 238, September 2000. 9. 
21 Ibid .. 21. 
22 Ibid .. 2. 
23 Thomas Carothers. "Aiding Democracy Abroad: Lessons from the late 1980s-90s.·' Global Economic 
Governance Programme: Oxford Universitv. <http://users.ox.ac.uk/-ntwo()(b/challdemocracv.htm> (5 
November 2(05). 










in its funding to civil society assistance programs - from about US$56 million in 1991 to 
over US$181 million in 1998.25 
In the mid-1980s and early-1990s, democracy assistance focused primarily on the 
promotion of free and fair elections, then shifted focus to reforming state institutions. It was 
not until the mid-1990s that strengthening civil society became a major priority of democracy 
aid programs. 26 Civil society groups had helped usher in the transition to democracy in many 
former authoritarian regimes. Many donors understood this to mean civil society would also 
play an important role in the consolidation of democracy. "It was from within civil society 
that opposition to authoritarian rule had emerged and therefore it was imperative 'to penetrate 
civil society and from therein assure control over popular mobilization",27 
Civil Society and the State 
As civil society assistance increases, a debate about the specific definition of civil 
society has emerged. Generally speaking, the idea of civil society interaction with the state is 
not a new one. What is different is the definition of the role and significance of civil society 
in creating and maintaining a successful democratic state. In the classical definition, there 
was little distinction between civil society and the state. Civil society and the state both 
"referred to a type of political association that governed social conflicts through the 
imposition of rules to restrain citizens from harming one another. ,,28 
The modem understanding of civil society as distinct from the state began to emerge 
in the late 18th century through the works of Thomas Paine and Georg Hegel, who postulated 
that civil society, as a separate entity from the state, allowed citizens a space where they 
could organize around their own interests.29 Hegel describes: "Located between the family 
and the state, civil society contained not only economic transactions but also their voluntary 
forms of organizations, such as corporations, professional associations, and trade unions.,,3o 
We will return to the specifics of what civil society encompasses in the next section. 
Soon afterwards, Alexis De Tocqueville's Democracy in America, depicted the 
importance of civil society as a force to oversee and provide a check on government, as well 
25 Omar G. Encarnacion. "Beyond Civil Society: Promoting Democracy after September 11." Orbis, Fall 2003. 
<http://www.fpri.org/pubs/orbisA704.encarnacion.beyondcivilsocietv.html> (16 August 2005). Para. 14 
26 Ottaway and Carothers, 6. 
27 Hearn, "Aiding Democracy," 816. 
2S Michael Bratton. "Civil Society and political transition in Africa" in Civil Society and the State in Africa 
edited by Harbeson et al. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994, ch. 3; 15 
29 Thomas Carothers. 'Think Again: Civil Society." Foreign Policy Magazine, Winter 1999-2000. 
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngus/civsoc.htm > (19 August 2005).p. IS 











as to educate citizens on democracy.3l He said not only that civil society functioned 
alongside a democracy, but went further as to say it was a necessary part of a successful 
democracy.32 The rise in significance of civil society further evolved in the aftermath of 
World War II. Notable among these scholars was Antonio Gramsci, who identified two 
entities working in parallel: first is the state, which rules through domination, and second is 
civil society, in which ideas and values of the people were able to challenge the state. 
Civil society once again gained theoretical importance after the end of the Cold War 
allowed civil society to flourish in formerly dictatorial countries. 33 As stated previously, civil 
society was an important force in the successful overthrow of undemocratic regimes in Latin 
America and Africa in the 1980s and 1990s, which sparked the idea that if civil society could 
force the transition to democracy, it could also force the solidification of democracy.34 
Civil Society Defined 
As the evolution of civil society emerges, both a broad and a narrow definition of the 
term remain debated by donor agencies. As Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers argue, 
"These debates are not purely academic. On the contrary, each definition implies a different 
course donors should pursue in order to promote civil society and, through it, democracy.,,35 
It is important to understand these two main conceptions of civil society in order to 
understand donor goals and motivations in civil society funding. Most scholars and 
practitioners agree that civil society encompasses voluntary groups that are not part of the 
state and not part of the family. There is disagreement, however, regarding how much the 
term actually encompasses. 
One perspective defines civil society broadly as autonomous, voluntary organizations, 
which encompasses any type of social organization - including recreation groups (e.g. 
running or tennis clubs), interest groups (e.g. garden clubs), professional organizations (e.g. 
business associations), trade unions, and advocacy groups (NGOs and other aid 
organizations), among others. For this broad definition, the real distinction is that the 
organization is not part of the formal state (and thus membership is voluntary and based on 
individual interest). 
,\ Ibid., 16. 
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Those who advocate this definition of civil society focus on these organizations' role 
in fostering reciprocity and trust. According to this view, largely popularized through the 
work of Robert Putnam, civil society is a necessary element of democracy because it helps 
foster social capital, which he defines as the "features of social organization such as 
networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual 
benefit.,,36 According to this theory, associations of any kind - not just political - contribute 
to democratic government by instilling values such as cooperation, solidarity, trust, and 
tolerance in members of these groupS.37 Greater associations also have an effect on the wider 
population, as these associations contribute to effective social collaboration, which Putnam 
argues is necessary for "effective democratic governance.'·38 He contends: 
Citizens in a civic community, on most accounts, are more than merely active, public-
spirited, and equal. Virtuous citizens are helpful, respectful, and trustful toward one 
another, even when they differ on matters of substance. The civic community is not 
likely to be blandly conflict-free, for its citizens have strong views on public issues, but 
they are tolerant of their opponents. 39 
A second perspective considers civil society as a narrow, political concept, which 
"identifies civil institutions and political activity as an essential component of the emergence 
of a particular type of political society based on the principles of citizenship, rights, 
democratic representation and the rule of law.,,4o This camp, supported by Larry Diamond, 
among others, believes that for democracy to consolidate and flourish, pluralism in civil 
society must exist. Diamond defines civil society as the: 
realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, 
autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules .. .it involves 
citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, and 
ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state, and hold 
state officials accountable. 41 (italics in original) 
From this perspective, civil society relates to the state without being part of the state.42 
Democracy becomes consolidated as a result of the effects civil society has on a variety of 
factors including: providing a check on government power; developing democratic values in 
36 Robert Putnam. "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital." Journal of Democracy, 6.1 (1995): 65-
78 July 1996. Project Muse <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal of democracv/v006/6.1 putnam.html> (22 
August 2005). 
37 Robert Putnam. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modem Italy (1993) Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 89-90 
38 Ibid., 90 . 
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citizens; creating non-government channels for representation; providing opportunities for 
participation; recruiting and training new political leaders; disseminating information; and 
spreading new information and ideas.43 
Moreover, because of the disputed definition of civil society, there is some disagreement 
on whether specific groups, such as political parties, should be included in civil society. 
While a majority agrees that political society is separate from civil society, others argue that 
these groups should be included, as they are not an official part of the state. As it relates to 
democracy assistance, "Donors have chosen to consider civil and political society as separate 
realms because ... doing so helps defend the claim that it is possible to support democracy 
without becoming involved in partisan politics or otherwise interfering unduly in the 
domestic politics of another country. ,,44 
Donor Perspectives on Civil Society 
Civil society donors have tended to follow similar patterns of aid distribution, which 
direct funding primarily to voluntary non-governmental organizations that promote 
democracy directly. These are organizations that "specifically seek interaction with the state, 
whether to advocate interests of the citizens, to oppose nondemocratic behavior of the state, 
or to hold states accountable to citizens for their actions.,,45 As a result, democracy assistance 
programs often end up focusing on a specific group of organizations: professionalized non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). These groups are generally dedicated to advocacy or 
civic education work on public interest issues directly relating to democratization, such as 
election monitoring, voter education, governmental transparency, and political and civil 
rights generally.46 
Other common non-political civil society groups are often excluded from foreign civil 
society support. Sports clubs, interest groups, and garden associations rarely receive aid from 
foreign democracy donors. As Ottaway and Carothers point out, foreign donors who want to 
make a visible impact with limited money "could hardly get in the business of setting up 
bowling leagues in the name of democracy." 47 
Advocacy NGOs working specifically for democracy promotion receive the bulk of 
civil society aid for a variety of reasons. First is the central belief by many donors that these 
41 Ibid., 7-11. 
44 Ottaway and Carothers, 11. 
4) Ibid. 
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advocacy groups are the most important segment of civil society in terms of democratization 
because they directly target democratic processes, which other civil society groups do not 
do.48 More practically, these professional advocacy NGOs are often better equipped to 
handle the bureaucratic requirements - such as writing grant proposals, providing budgeting 
and accounting reports, and conducting impact assessments - than other types civil society 
. . 49 
orgamzatIOns. 
The idea that democracy-focused advocacy groups are the key to consolidating 
democracy is problematic, however, as other types of civil society groups have played a large 
part in democratization in the past. In South Africa, for instance, many segments of civil 
society, including local community groups, universities, and churches, played an important 
role in ending apartheid. Democracy advocacy groups were less important than the social 
groups that were able to organize mass mobilization of apartheid's opponents. 
This is not to say that other types of organizations and groups do not receive funding 
from foreign donors. Rather, these other civil society groups do not receive such funding 
specifically under the auspices of democracy assistance or civil society support. Donors 
differentiate between funding going to civil society groups working towards democracy and 
those that are working for other goals. NGOs focusing on economic and social development 
- health, education, job training, etc. - undoubtedly have an effect on the development of 
civil society and democracy, despite the fact that they do not receive aid specifically for the 
purpose of democracy and governance. 50 If donors are trying simply to develop civil society, 
this goal is achieved through all aid to non-governmental organizations - not just those 
specifically tied to democracy assistance programs. 
In recent years, however, donors have begun to expand the scope of what they fund in 
terms of civil society support. More and more they have expanded their definition to include 
advocacy NGOs that work for issues other than democracy promotion, including 
environmental protection, gender equality, and human rights. Donors are also expanding the 
diversity of groups supported from traditionally large urban-based advocacy NGOs to 
including more local groups based throughout recipient countries. However, "this 
broadening process has been slow and cautious, and in their democracy-oriented programs, 
donors continue supporting above all urban-based advocacy and civic education NGOS."SI 
,)8 Ibid., 295 . 
.)<j Ibid., 13. 
51) Ibid. 











Civil Society Aid Proponents 
As donors intensify civil society funding, they argue that civil society - and civil 
society assistance in particular - aids democratization. These proponents often argue that 
civil society groups not only work in parallel to the democratic state, but are necessary for the 
successful transition and consolidation of democracy. The first function civil society 
performs is to legitimize state power. By mobilizing popular consent, civil society can be a 
source of the state's legitimization in terms of political power, legislative rules, and the use of 
force. 52 
Another important role of civil society is as a watchdog over government action. 
Civil society groups often pay closer attention to legislation and government action than 
citizens themselves would. These organizations are able to identify, acquire and disseminate 
important information to their constituents. Information becomes more accessible to citizens, 
and thus citizens have greater opportunity for political participation. Moreover, civil society 
has the sway to provide a powerful counter to the government (whereas an individual may 
not be as influential). Not only do civil society groups often have networks to mobilize 
citizens to action, but they also have the resources and time to promote their interests. In this 
manner, civil society is an outlet for public opinion, ensuring that public interest in 
considered. More importantly, they have the ability to act when the information they find 
points to government misconduct - including corruption, human rights abuses, and reneging 
on promIses. 
One example of civil society success in this regard occurred in the mid-1990s, when 
the Green Belt Association of Kenya pushed the Kenyan government to improve its human 
rights record by advising the Paris Club to suspend aid if the President Arap Moi did not 
comply.53 Another example that illustrates a more direct relationship between the state and 
civil society was the Treatment Action Campaign's successful 2001 court case against the 
South African government, which forced the government to provide anti-retroviral 
medication for the prevention of mother-to-child HIV transmission. 
Proponents of civil society aid argue that even when social organizations do not 
directly challenge the state they contribute to a successful democracy. Donors argue that they 
are also creating a robust democratic culture by supporting groups that nurture habits such as 
<;2 Bratton, 25. 
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trust and cooperation that are necessary to uphold a democracy (even when the group itself is 
not working for democracy promotion).54 
Finally, these proponents argue that foreign aid can help to develop the robust civil 
society that is necessary for democracy to flourish. While foreign donors can try to impose 
democratization externally, democracy cannot fully flourish without domestic support. By 
supporting domestic non-governmental groups, donors are also supporting the means for this 
domestic democratic culture to develop. 
Civil Society Aid Opponents 
Some opponents have emerged argumg that civil society aid is not effective in 
supporting democratization. A robust civil society is only one factor that has been identified 
as important to the consolidation of democracy. Other factors - such as an historical 
presence of civil society, levels of economic growth and inequality, and colonial legacy -
have a great impact on democratization. While the impact of civil society promotion has not 
been empirically determined, "the evidence fairly consistently indicates that such assistance 
alone is unlikely to be a major factor.,,55 
Others argue that civil society cannot be created through aid - it must develop 
indigenously. Civil society has been shown to develop differently across different regions 
and cultures. Some studies show that civil society groups that are imposed externally on 
societies have a low rate of success. 56 Further studies have found that donor aid has failed to 
spur the formation of indigenous civil society groups, even in regions where donors focused 
significant attention on civil society development.57 
Many go so far as to argue that not only is civil society aid not effective in promoting 
democracy, but that civil society itself is not an essential pillar of democracy. There is little 
doubt that civil society aid has helped many NGOs survive and thrive. However, simply 
sustaining the existence of NGOs does not inherently mean that civil society is robust or 
beneficial to democracy. If civil society aid merely supports a few advocacy NGOs that have 
little impact on the citizens, the aid may do little to benefit overall democracy in the recipient 
country. 
A further argument is that civil society in and of itself is not inherently good. Simply 
being labeled under the umbrella of "civil society" does not necessarily signify that an 
5~ Encarnacion. 
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organization has honorable goals or positive effects. Under the definition identified above, 
civil society can include racist organizations like the Ku Klux Klan and terrorist groups like 
al-Qaeda. Even groups that do not deliberately have negative intentions can cause negative 
consequences. Single-issue civil society groups, for example the National Rifle Association, 
are "intensely, even myopically, focused on their own agendas; they are not interested in 
balancing different visions of the public good.,,58 These groups focus on the interests of their 
members, which often represent only a small portion of the overall population. What may be 
good for these groups may be harmful to the public as a whole. 
Even when organizations form with righteous aims, they cannot exclusively lead to 
good governance. Stable political institutions are necessary for a successful functioning 
government. Civil society can only flourish and function effectively if the constraints of the 
government structure allows for it. If a state has a credible government with laws that allow 
for citizens to challenge political actions, civil society can play necessary oversight and 
public advocacy roles. However, under a repressive government, civil society is stilted and 
has few official outlets for representation. In such a situation with weak political institutions, 
opponents argue that civil society can even undermine democracy by "fostering a host of 
negative forms of social capital, such as apathy, cynicism, and intolerance."s9 
Even with a strong political system, civil society influence does not always lead to the 
best governance result for the public. Groups can sway government legislation in favor of 
those with more money, time, or political connections.6o Groups that are better organized can 
get their agendas heard, while those with less capacity - historically the poorer classes -
remain voiceless. 
Furthermore, because specific interest groups can often form easier than the masses, 
opponents argue that civil society should not automatically be seen as a representation of the 
people's wishes. Many NGOs are completely donor dependent. Without the foreign support 
they receive, they would not be sustainable. Foreign donors are accountable to either 
taxpayers in their own countries (in the case of bilateral or multilateral organizations) or 
board members and individual donors (in the case of private foundations or grantmakers). 
Notably, they are not accountable to the citizens or governments who receive the aid. This 
may cause a mismatch between donor goals and recipient goals as they relate to democracy 
and civil society. 
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Additionally, civil society organizations that receIve funding and support from 
external sources sometimes represent only a small portion of the domestic population. "The 
burgeoning NGO sectors in such countries are often dominated by elite-run groups that have 
only tenuous ties to the citizens on whose behalf they claim to act, and they depend on 
international funders for budgets they cannot nourish from domestic sources.,,61 This point is 
causing increasing conflict between donors and recipient country governments. 
Attacks from Developing Democracies 
Civil society assistance has come under increasing attack by the governments in 
countries that receive such aid. The politicians in these emerging democracies have 
increasingly criticized foreign-backed civil society organizations for undermining state 
legitimacy. Russian President Vladimir Putin, for instance, has publicly criticized Russian 
NGOs that work with political issues for accepting international funds, and recently signed a 
law requiring all NGOs to inform the government of every project they plan to carry OUt.62 In 
December 2004, Zimbabwe's parliament passed legislation prohibiting domestic NGOs from 
receiving external aid. 63 Similarly in Belarus, President Aleksandr Lukashenko banned all 
political or educational activities from accepting international funding. Invectives against 
foreign-funded civil society groups have emerged around the globe - from Ethiopia to 
Kazakhstan to Venezuela. 
There is no doubt that in the past many foreign donors worked precisely for the goal 
of weakening state sovereignty. Before the end of apartheid in South Africa, for instance, 
civil society organizations largely funded by external sources were working with the goal of 
undermining the legitimacy of the apartheid state and ushering in a new majority government. 
However, in the post-apartheid era, undermining state legitimacy is no longer a primary goal 
of donors. Foreign donors undeniably come to developing countries with a set agenda, 
although this agenda is not necessarily one that is contrary to the agenda of the elected 
government in power. Often, the aims and goals of the two groups are similar. In the above 
case of post-apartheid South Africa, for instance, "Few would dispute the goals that many 
donors are helping South African NGOs pursue - such as consolidating and deepening 
61 Carothers, "Think Again: Civil Society," 20. 
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democracy, promoting participatory development, protecting human rights, and promoting 
clean and accountable governance.,,64 
Conclusion 
Since the early 1980s, democracy aid has become an increasingly popular means 
through which foreign governments endeavor to affect change in the developing world. Civil 
society development has been the object of a particularly strong focus from a wide range of 
donors. Bilateral aid agencies, multilateral organizations, private foundations, and others 
have poured millions of dollars into democracy aid and civil society. Despite the intense 
scrutiny and attention that foreign aid and democracy promotion has received, several key 
questions remain. Is foreign aid effective in developing democracy? Is civil society support 
an effective means of consolidating democracy? And, is civil society development even the 
most effective way to support that consolidation? Yet, as these questions remain 
unanswered, donors continue with increasing support to civil society. As the field of civil 
society development and democracy assistance becomes increasingly important, it will be 
necessary to fully examine the impacts of this aid. 
6-l Terence Smith. Ismail Davids and Glenn HoIIands. Mbeki's Attacks on NGOs Undermine Civil Society's 
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CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Civil society has played an important role in South Africa's political history. 
Specifically, the resistance groups that operated - often clandestinely - in the country in the 
1970s and 1980s were integral to bringing about the end of the apartheid regime. Later, these 
same groups, and others, were instrumental in assuring a smooth and successful transition to 
democracy in the 1990s. As domestic groups operating largely without the approval of the 
state, these groups relied heavily on foreign assistance for support. Many external donors 
provided funding throughout the periods of resistance and transition to support the creation of 
a democratic South Africa. 
This chapter will examme the role that domestic civil society has played m 
apartheid's downfall and in South Africa's subsequent transition to and consolidation of 
democracy. Additionally, this chapter will provide details of the foreign donors that 
supported these efforts. This chapter will first describe civil society's character and role in 
South Africa during the apartheid era. Next, it will examine civil society today by providing 
an overview of the sector, problems encountered during the transition to democracy, and its 
interaction with the new state. Finally, this chapter will include a discussion of foreign 
donors and their interaction with government and civil society in the new multi-racial South 
Africa. 
Civil Society in Apartheid-Era South Africa 
In less than two decades South Africa has transformed itself from a racially 
segregated authoritarian regime to a democratic success story. Under South Africa's 
apartheid (meaning "apartness") regime, people were classified as either White, Black, 
Coloured, or Indian, and granted differing levels of civil rights corresponding to their racial 
classification. This led to great inequality in political and civil freedoms. On one end of the 
spectrum, Whites, with the most freedom, were able to vote, openly move about the country 
and enjoy access to quality health care, education and other social services. Blacks, on the 
other end of the freedom scale, were forced into separate tribal 'homelands' and were subject 
to vast inequalities and discrimination. 
In 1990, with mounting internal and external resistance, a move away from apartheid 
began when the White-led regime unbanned several resistance groups, including the popular 











Nelson Mandela was released from Robben Island after 27 years as a political prisoner. Soon 
after, the apartheid government's National Party began talks with a variety of non-White 
groups, eventually leading to multi-racial elections and a Government of National Unity. 
With the first majority election in 1994, the ANC won 62.6 percent of the votes and 252 seats 
in parliament (out of 400).65 The ANC was now head of a democratic South Africa, with the 
National Party and the primarily Zulu Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) holding noteworthy 
positions of power. With Nelson Mandela as president, a new era in South African politics 
began. After three national elections, the country seems to have transitioned to a well-
functioning democracy, with the ANC continuing to hold a firm grip on political power with 
66.4 percent of the vote in 1999 and nearly 70 percent in 2004.66 
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Civil Society's Role in Ending Apartheid 
Civil society played an important role in the transition to democracy in South Africa. 
For example, local community-based organizations (CBOs) organized rallies around social 
service issues like quality housing and access to water. Labor unions attacked the 
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government economically by mobilizing workers. Underground resistance groups helped 
create the political structure that could be put in place after a successful transition. Even 
student organizations put pressure on the government through protests and other resistance 
activities. 
In 1983, the United Democratic Front (UDF) was formed as an umbrella organization 
of anti-apartheid civil society groups with the goal of the "creation of a single, nonracial, 
unfragmented South Africa.,,68 It became a leading anti-apartheid organization and gained 
mass support from civil society groups throughout the country. By the late 1980s, there were 
more than 600 community, religious, and student groups affiliated with the UDF.69 
Apartheid-Era Civil Society Development 
The politics of apartheid South Africa determined the types of civil society groups 
that developed in the country prior to the transition to democracy. Apartheid South Africa 
fostered the development of an unusually robust civil society. These organizations were 
formed not only for the purpose of actively resisting the political oppression and enforced 
inequality of the National Party government, but also were formed to carry out necessary 
social services that were not being provided by the apartheid government. 
Because many of these organizations were a threat to the apartheid regime, strict rules 
were developed determining how civil society groups could be formed and funded. Four 
main pieces of legislation controlled such organization: (1) The Prohibition of Political 
Interference Act (1974) was "aimed at preventing any organization which the minister 
deemed 'unfit' from receiving foreign funding."; (2) the Affected Organisations Act (1974) 
"prevented any organization involved in anti-apartheid activities from receiving funds from 
outside South Africa"; (3) the Disclosure of Foreign Funding Act (1989) "required that 
organizations report all funds received to the government"; and (4) the Fund-Raising Act 
(1978) "prevented organizations from receiving funds from the public, both within and 
outside South Africa, unless they had a fund-raising number obtained from the 
govemment.,,70 However, while the government imposed strict regulations and control on 
civil society groups, it largely ignored these organizations as long as they were seemingly 
oR Christopher Landsberg, "Voicing the Voiceless: Foreign Political Aid to Civil Society in South Africa." in 
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I·· I 71 apo ltIca . The presence of service-oriented welfare groups for Blacks, 72 for instance, 
allowed the White government to justify its lack of social services for the non-White 
population. 73 This allowed Black civil society - including not only service-oriented welfare 
groups, but also religious groups, student organizations, and others - to continue to grow 
during apartheid. 
As a result of strict government controls on citizen groups, Black and White civil 
society developed in two separate spheres. White civil society, which was able to enjoy 
broad political freedoms such as the right to associate and organize, formed a formalized civil 
society that operated largely under the apartheid regime (although not necessarily in 
collaboration with it).74 These White-centered civil society groups were involved largely in 
social services, such as health and education, as well as cultural and sports associations.75 
Because of the apolitical nature of their work, these civil society groups were able to thrive 
even under the apartheid government's strict regulations - especially those groups that 
provided welfare services to the White community.76 This is not to say that anti-apartheid 
groups did not emerge in the White community; they did. Groups such as Black Sash and 
Idasa (formerly the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa) formed precisely 
with the goal of ushering in a new majority-rule political system. 
In contrast to White civil society, Black groups - even if ostensibly apolitical - did 
not have government backing, nor did they have a middle class base to provide financial 
support.77 Instead, Black civil society was mainly characterized by informal, poor, 
politically disenfranchised groupS.78 Many Black organizations were forced to operate in 
secret - often with the explicit goal of overthrowing the government. Many of these 
organizations considered themselves Black alternatives to the 'official' White government.79 
An artificial unity emerged as groups with otherwise varying interests came together for the 
purpose of opposing apartheid. Even groups founded on apolitical principles worked towards 
political means by pushing social issues during apartheid. In townships and other Black areas 
71 Bec Russell and Mark Swilling. "The Size and Scope of the Non-Profit Sector in South Africa." Centre for 
Civil Society, 2002. 68-9. 
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throughout South Africa, civics emerged. These were community groups created to address 
citizens' complains about social issues, such as poor education, high housing rents, and even 
the number of available clothing lines. 80 These grievances were acts of resistance towards 
the apartheid regime, which had created problems and failed to provide necessary services. 
Foreign Funding to Apartheid-Era Civil Society 
Many of these civil society resistance efforts were funded by foreign donors. From 
overhead and office expenses to training and travel, international funders played an important 
role in the sustainability of anti-apartheid civil society groupS.81 Millions of dollars were 
channeled (often secretly) to key civil society groups in the struggle against apartheid. 82 This 
aid was overtly political, as the goal of this funding was, for the most part, to aid in the 
breakdown of the apartheid state. However, despite its political implications, foreign donors 
saw the support of civil society groups as a legitimate way to back the anti-apartheid effort 
without getting too involved in the politics of apartheid. For international donors involved in 
the Cold War, such as the United States, funding civil society groups was an ideal way to 
oppose apartheid "without directly assisting a political movement they considered too radical 
and too close to Moscow.,,83 However, some bilateral donors, such as Denmark and Sweden, 
d . d' I 84 supporte reSIstance groups Irect y. 
International assistance to South African civil society began as early as the 1960s and 
continued through until the transition in 1994. The Nordic countries were among the first to 
provide this type of support, with Sweden donating about US$400 million to anti-apartheid 
groups such as the ANC, labor unions, and others between 1972 and 1993.85 By the 1980s, 
South Africa had been ostracized in the international political community, and economic 
sanctions were imposed against the country. Additional civil society support for the anti-
apartheid effort came at this time from donors such as the European Union, Britain, the 
United States, Germany, and France. 86 In the nine years before 1994, the European Union 
and the United States donated close to US$1 billion to support a successful transition.87 
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The umque nature of foreign funding to the anti-apartheid effort - often donated 
clandestinely and often to groups banned by the government - meant that donors did not 
adhere to the same strict funding policies that were required of groups in countries with 
different political environments. Because of the apartheid government's strict controls, 
donors and civil society groups tried to avoid financial scrutiny by being purposely non-
transparent in their funding. This led to poor record-keeping, few external audits, and no real 
donor oversight on how funds were spent. 88 International donors often gave local 
organizations - notably the South African Catholic Bishops Conference, the South African 
Council of Churches, and Kagiso Trust - significant power to determine how funds were 
disbursed, with regard to who received funds and what activities were funded. 89 With such a 
bottom-up approach to allocation, civil society groups were not required to write frequent 
grant requests, project proposals, or impact assessments. Administratively weak 
organizations, which otherwise would not have been able to compete for foreign funding, 
were able to thrive in an arguably bloated civil society environment. 
South Africa's racially unequal political history led to the development of a 
particularly robust civil society in both the White and Black communities. While Whites 
enjoyed the freedom to associate and organize, Blacks often had to be secretive about the 
existence and nature of the groups that emerged in their communities. Nevertheless, this 
sector played an important role in bringing down the apartheid government, largely through 
the support of foreign donors. This funding relationship was unusually flexible, as funding 
disbursement was often decided on the ground. 
South Africa's Civil Society Today 
Apartheid's legacy left South Africa with a particularly strong civil society sector that 
was experienced at interacting with a variety of donors. With the unbanning of several 
resistance groups in 1990, and the transition to a majority-rule democratic system in 1994, 
many civil society organizations found themselves at a crossroads. For years these groups 
had been fighting for the end of apartheid, and their mission was now accomplished. With 
such success, though, came an uncertainty about their future. They would have to adjust to 
new challenges facing the South African state or dissolve. Not only would groups have to 
change their mission, but they would have to change the way in which they operated as well. 
While working under apartheid required these civil society groups to be flexible and 
xx Kihato, 8. 











grassroots-based, these groups instead found that the new democratic system was conducive 
to formal, professionalized groupS.90 
With South Africa's transition to democracy, White civil society groups now found 
themselves in political and donor environments that were quite different from what they were 
accustomed. State funding was no longer guaranteed, and those organizations that provided 
social services would have to expand their clientele to include a more diverse population.91 
While a favorable relationship with the apartheid government may have been beneficial prior 
to 1994 as groups sought government funding and approval, the perception of closeness with 
the former government was detrimental after the transition. 
Black civil society groups, on the other hand, were poised to work in collaboration 
with the government for the first time. However, how they would work together was unclear. 
These groups were forced to change their strategies not once, but twice, in the early 1990s. 
First, in 1990, many previously banned groups were allowed to operate publicly for the first 
time in years. In the past these groups focused on bringing the apartheid government to the 
political bargaining table, but after democracy seemed inevitable they begun to focus on 
assuring a successful transition. Civil society's strategy had to change once again in 1994, 
after the ANC won an amazing 62.6 percent of the national vote. The ANC, which itself had 
been an underground political civil society group until only recently, was suddenly leading 
the new South African state. The focus for both civil society and government then shifted 
from the transition to the consolidation of democracy. Unlike in the previous apartheid 
government, civil society groups in the new South Africa were sympathetic and supportive of 
the new ANC leadership. The new government, likewise, emphasized early on the important 
role that civil society had to play in the country. 
Demographics of Today' s Civil Society 
South Africa's political past has left a mark on the way civil society has evolved since 
the country's transition to democracy. South Africa's civil society today is not made up of 
new organizations, but rather consists mainly of organizations that have persisted since the 
apartheid era. A recent study found that in 1999 the average age of a South African civil 
society group was 19 years. Religious and health groups were the oldest (on average 38 
years and 31 years, respecti vel y), followed by environmental groups (24 years) and social 
'i() Reitzes and Friedman. 19. 











services (23 years).92 The goals of many of these organizations have shifted over time as 
many civil society groups began to focus on either providing services or engaging in 
advocacy work.93 Many of the groups that were previously involved in pushing for the end 
of apartheid began focusing on functions necessary for democracy - developing political 
parties, acting in government watchdog roles, or advocating increasingly pressing healthcare 
issues, such as HIV / AIDS prevention and treatment. Today, South Africa also has several 
civil society groups that do not have an expressly political purpose. These groups include 
religious organizations, such as churches; student youth groups; stokvels, which act as 
community investment cooperatives; burial societies, and sport and recreation teams.94 The 
majority of civil society groups in South Africa today are informal associations, with 
community-based groups making up 53 percent of all civil society members. 95 
Whereas in the past, civil society was largely segregated either by mission, race, or 
privilege, the end of apartheid allowed civil society groups to organize with greater pluralism 
on the basis of common interest and no longer strictly on racial background or political 
affiliation.96 As discussed previously, however, many civil society groups today are at least 
ideologically aligned with the ruling ANC. As Reitzes and Friedman explain, "Because 
South Africa's racial history means that the [civil society organizations (CSOs)] with the 
most capacity to offer an influential voice to citizens will be those broadly sympathetic to 
majority aspirations, and the ANC continues to dominate majority politics, the future of 
South Africa civil society is likely to be largely determined by CSOs which lean to the 
governing party.,,97 
In total, about 100,000 groups make up South Africa's civil society.98 The size of this 
sector has a considerable impact on the country's economy as a whole. In 1998, South 
Africa's non-profit sector spent R9.3 billion. The sector also employed 645,316 workers, 
which represented 9 percent of the formal non-agricultural economy.99 These workers came 
92 Ibid., 22. 
93 Charm Govender. "Trends in Civil Society in South Africa today," Urnrabulo. December 2001 
<hltp://www.anc.org.l,Jancdocs/pubs/umrabulo/urnrabulo 13rn.htrn1> No. 13 
94 Russell and Swilling, 10. 
95 Ibid., 20. 
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98 Russell and Swilling's study "Size and Scope of South Africa's Civil Society" found 98,920 Non-Profit 
Organizations in 1999. They defined non-protit organizations by five key characteristics: organised; private; 
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from traditionally underrepresented populations, with 59 percent women workers and 73 
percent Black workers. 100 
As Table 1 shows, South Africa's civil society covers diverse needs and interests, 
with social service groups leading the pack (22,755 groups or 23 percent of the total sector in 
1999). This was followed by culture and recreation groups (20.8 percent of the total), 
development and housing (20.6 percent), and religious groups (11.8 percent). Organizations 
focusing specifically on advocacy and politics accounted for only 6.9 percent of the sector, 
although they employed 14 percent of the total civil society workforce. 101 
Table 1: Number and Percentage of Civil Society by Sector l02 
Ilil Ibid .. 23. 
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Foreign funding continues to play an important role in South African civil society 
today. A 2001 survey of civil society in the country found that most organizations (69 
percent) said they received at least some funding from international donors, with as much as 
44 percent getting more than half of their funding from private international donors, foreign 
government donors, or multilateral organizations. I04 This is not the only source of funding 
however, as a variety of domestic donors now provide funding to this sector. The South 
African government, for instance, contributed R5.8 billion in 1999, which constituted 42 
percent of total funding to the sector. IOS The domestic private sector donated another R3 
billion. lo6 As this shows, although external donors continue to playa prominent role in civil 
society funding, internal sources have gained growing importance. 
Civil Society and the New South African Government 
Because of its historically close links with civil society, the new South African state 
asserted the importance of civil society for a functioning democracy early in the transition 
process. The 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme, drafted by the new 
government, stated: 
1113 Ibid. 
Ill-! Institute for Democracy in South Africa and the Co-operative for Research and Education, "Results of An 
Organizational Survey for a Report on 'The State of Civil Society in South Africa." 2001, 
<www.idasa.org.;.alghOutputFiks.asp·.·WriteContenl=Y&RID=4l)o>(25ApriI2oo6).p 12 
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the democratic order we envisage must foster a wide range of institutions of 
participatory democracy in partnership with civil society on the basis of informed and 
empowered citizens ... A wide range of trade unions, mass organisations, other sectoral 
movements and community-based organisations (CBOs) such as civic associations 
developed in our country in opposition to apartheid oppression. These social 
movements and CBOs are a major asset in the effort to democratise and develop our 
society.lo7 
Partially in recognition of this importance, the government soon constructed legislation to 
make the environment more conducive to a thriving civil society. These legislative measures 
include "a national registration procedure for [non-profit organizations (NPOs)], a new state 
funding body to raise public, private, and international funding for NPOs, a national lottery 
for a similar purpose, and an elaborate new tax structure to stimulate grant-making to 
NPOS.,,108 
Arguably, civil society has already proven itself to be a necessary part of a successful 
South African democracy. Civil society has played a practical role by influencing 
government policy. For instance, the sector has been instrumental in the legislative process 
by providing information and policy options to members of Parliament while legislation is 
being drafted and debated. lo9 Secondly, civil society has played an important watchdog 
function by monitoring many national and local governmental actions. By following the 
processes and decisions of government, civil society groups could ensure that the interests of 
the public were being met. 
While leaders of the new state had expectations that civil society groups would carry 
out the traditional tasks of monitoring government, they also expected civil society to help 
carry out the government's social agenda, which included expanded welfare services, job 
creation, health care, and poverty eradication. 110 "J abu Moleketi [current Deputy Minister of 
Finance and member of the ANC's National Executive Committee since 1994], argued that 
the survival of the sector was essential because NGOs could bolster the government's 
capacity to deliver. .. The government therefore saw civil society as a developmental partner 
(although the term 'partnership' had not gained currency at the time) that could bolster the 
capacity of the state; it therefore saw the sector performing a technical, apolitical role."lll 
Civil society groups, however, did not necessarily see their role as an extension of the 
official state development plan. This clash in expectations between civil society and 
107 Government of South Africa. "Reconstruction and Development Programme," Polity: Policy and Law Online 
News. (1994) <http://www.politv.org.za/html/govclocs/rclp/rdp5.html#5.13> 5.2.6 (14 June 2006). 
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government was a point of contention. In the eyes of the new government, civil society 
should be an ally, supporting government actions as the country strives to develop into a 
strong consolidated democracy. State actors would like to see civil society as an extension of 
the state. Groups that criticize the government are seen as opponents, and their actions are 
interpreted as hindering the state from accomplishing its democratic goals. lll "In the 
government's view, the more outspoken civil society groups were failing to discriminate 
between the prior apartheid regime and the new government - instead of helping the new 
government succeed with its reform program, civil society groups were being so critical that 
they were making it much more difficult to make progress.,,1\3 
This animosity also sprang from expectations over how and where funding would be 
distributed. Because the government interpreted its goals as aligned with those of civil 
society, the state pushed for NGO and other civil society group funding to be channeled 
through government. I 14 This caused concern among civil society groups, which interpreted 
this proposal as a means of government control over the sector. While civil society wanted to 
define its relationship with the state as autonomous, the state was attempting to set up 
structures that would make it dependent on government. Strain also developed between the 
two sectors as they began appealing to similar funding sources. International donors who 
wanted to support democracy or social welfare efforts now had to choose between funding 
the civil society groups it had supported in the past or funding government programs 
directly. I 15 Thus, the competition between civil society and the government over limited 
development funds intensified. 
Foreign Funding to Post-Apartheid Civil Society 
With changing civil society and government structures, so too came changing funding 
structures. Donors had to shift from a focus on strengthening and supporting the resistance 
movement to strengthening and supporting the new democratic system. 116 While prior to 
1994, it was easy for donors to distinguish the apartheid government as 'bad' and anti-
apartheid civil society as 'good', both sides were now working for the same goals and 
donors' funding had to reflect that change. II7 Funding to civil society was not eliminated 
completely, but was diminished significantly as government institutions began to get an 
112 Lippman et al., 6. 
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increasing share of international aid. For donors who had long supported efforts for an end to 
apartheid, this was an opportunity to directly influence the structure and character of the 
South African government. 
In funding both civil society and government, overall donor trends represented a 
desire to support first the transition, then the consolidation of democracy. Patterns emerged 
as international donors worked toward this goal. Funding evolved, "moving from historical 
support patterns (with a stronger emphasis on civil society), into policy-making, and then into 
the 'consolidation' activities of piloting and capacity-building. The initial phases reflect both 
strategic and 'ad hoc' funding tendencies on the part of the donors as they finalized historical 
civil society relationships and introduced new partnerships with government." 1 18 
During the years between the unbanning and the election (from 1990-94) foreign 
funds to civil society came with a new goal - to support the transition process. This was 
accomplished through activities such as building the capacity of the new political parties, 
funding research that would help civil society groups during the negotiation process, and 
establishing civic education programs to a citizenry that had never before voted. 119 As the 
election neared, however, donors became increasingly focused on funding support for the 
anticipated multi-racial state. 
In general, foreign funding continued in a substantial capacity even after the 
democratic transition. This aid increased after 1994 as donors prioritized the needs of the 
new South African government. The amount of official foreign aid peaked in 1997, with 
R3.8 billion before it began to decline as a result of increased confidence in the consolidation 
of democracy and the abilities of the new government to be effective without continued 
financial assistance. 120 Technical assistance also made up a major part of contributions to the 
new state, as donors from the United Kingdom, Sweden, Japan, Australia and the United 
States all provided consultants and other non-monetary assistance to the new government. 121 
Challenges Facing Post-Apartheid Civil Society 
South African civil society encountered many problems during the country's 
transition to democracy that forced the sector to reinvent itself in order to stay alive. Many of 
these problems stemmed from the nature of the donor environment prior to the end of 
liS Glenda White, Chris Heymans, Merle Favis, and Jeets Hargovan. "Development Co-operation Report: 
Evaluation of ODA to DEMOCRACY and GOOD GOVERNANCE," International Organisation Development, 
June 2000, iii. 
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apartheid, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Apartheid's legacy created a civil society that 
was not accustomed to competing for funding and was therefore administratively unprepared 
for sustaining itself after apartheid ended. These factors - along with other problems 
including the need for a new mission, decreased and unpredictable funding, loss of human 
capital, and increasing government criticism - contributed to an overall weak civil society 
that emerged after the transition. 
After decades of working toward the end of apartheid and the introduction of a 
majority-rule government, many civil society groups found themselves unsure of how to 
proceed in this new political era. While in the past they had focused on resisting government, 
they now were supposed to work with government. This created a crisis in mission for most 
of these groups, when they found there was no need for them to continue performing their old 
duties. 122 As civil society groups were trying to redefine their goals, donors began pulling 
back support. This abrupt and seemingly sudden withdrawal of international funds left many 
civil society groups in shock. The 1980s had created a culture of donor dependency, as South 
African civil society had never achieved sustainability on its own. Not only were these 
groups not used to fundraising from their own government, but they also were not prepared to 
apply formally for grants from international foundations and other foreign donors. A 1995 
study of civil society organizations found that the groups surveyed were lacking two-thirds of 
their operating budget for that year. 123 The same study found that in the period between 1992 
and 1994, about 1,000 social welfare groups were "on the brink of financial collapse.,,124 
Donor dependency continues to be a weakness in South African civil society today. 
This decline in funding resulted in a loss of depth in civil society, which primarily 
affected advocacy and watchdog groups. "Donors have made little, if any, money available 
for monitoring of government policies and for advocacy work to be done around weak and 
. d f l' . ,,12) ma equate areas 0 po ICY or practIce. - This deficit affects civil society's ability to 
perform its democratic function of ensuring government oversight and accountability. Even 
funding that was received by civil society groups was now often unreliable and unpredictable. 
The erratic nature of this funding made it difficult for civil society groups to plan programs 
and projects to carry out in the short term or to make plans for the future. More energy and 
122 White et aI., 58. 
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staff expertise was exerted on acquiring additional funding, and this increased the instability 
of the sector in the years immediately following the transition. 126 
This loss in financial capital was exacerbated by an additional loss in human capital. 
While apartheid had left no place for intelligent, ambitious Black South Africans within the 
state, many of these people were attracted to civil society, largely working to change the 
political system. After democracy emerged, many of these same people went to be a part of 
the new government they had worked so hard to achieve. Others went to higher paying jobs 
in the private sector, as businesses wanting to improve diversity tapped into this pool of 
potential employees. Additionally, the weakening of civil society due to declining and 
unreliable funding pushed more out as they sought more stable employment. 127 
A further challenge to today's civil society is the recent attacks on the sector by the 
ANC government. As discussed, the government envisioned an important role for the sector, 
primarily in working to carry out the state's social programs. With civil society groups 
increasingly criticizing government actions, however, the relationship has begun to sour. 
Publicly, the ANC has denounced civil society groups for their acceptance of foreign funds. 
Both former and current presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki have publicly attacked 
segments of South African civil society for lacking domestic legitimacy and harming the 
government in order to push the agendas of foreign governments. In a 1997 speech at the 
ANC's 50th anniversary in Mafikeng, Mandela asserted: 
[Certain elements of the NGO community in South Africa] lack the issue-driven 
mass base that is the defining feature of any real NGO and are therefore unable to 
raise funds from the people themselves. This has also created the possibility for 
some of these NGOs to act as instruments of foreign governments and institutions 
that fund them to promote the interests of these external forces. 128 
This speech resulted in a further decline of funding from foreign donors who were not eager 
to anger the new South African government. 
The transition to democracy left South Africa with a very different civil society than it 
had during apartheid. While civil society groups, largely foreign funded, had played a 
significant role in bringing down apartheid, they soon found their role limited. As multi-
racial government was ushered in, foreign donors shifted their focus to state funding, as 
opposed to civil society funding. Civil society was left with declining financial support and a 
need to redefine a mission that had been largely accomplished. With abut 100,000 
126 Kihato, 16. 
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organizations, South African civil society today is substantial, yet largely informal, 
encompassmg areas such as social welfare, culture, religion, and advocacy. Most 
organizations receive at least some funding from foreign sources, although this amount has 
decreased considerably since the 1980s. Its relationship with government is strong, yet can 
be hostile at times. This not withstanding, civil society continues to play an important role in 
the successful democratization of South Africa. 
Conclusion 
South African civil society was integral in ending the oppressIve apartheid state. 
Foreign donor support assisted those groups in achieving civil society's goal of a majority-
ruled government. Foreign assistance has played a major role in South Africa for decades -
throughout the anti-apartheid struggle, the transition, and the consolidation process of 
democracy. The legacy of apartheid left the country with a particularly strong and robust 
civil society, yet as apartheid ended and donor attentions were refocused on the new ANC-Ied 
government, civil society was weakened considerably. Still, government officials, many of 
whom came from civil society themselves, stressed the important role civil society had to 
play in the new South Africa. The government saw this role as primarily in the area of 
service delivery. As many civil society organizations saw their role more focused on their 
government watchdog and advocacy functions, tensions began to mount between the two 
groups. There is no dispute that civil society has played, and will continue to play, an 
important part in South Africa's political transformation. Both non-governmental and 












FOREIGN DONORS AND SOUTH AFRICAN CIVIL SOCIETY TODAY 
South Africa receives an enormous amount of attention from donors around the world 
who are interested in promoting democracy assistance. While in most African countries 
democracy assistance makes up less than 5 percent of total aid,129 in South Africa it accounts 
for up to 50 percent from some government donors. l3O South Africa's role as the region's 
economic hegemon has given it particular importance for donors. A democratic South Africa 
is a strategic goal of many bilateral and multilateral donors, as they hope to boost the 
country's position in the region. Civil society in particular has played an unusually large role 
in donors' democracy funding to South Africa. While most bilateral and multilateral funding 
(which makes up the majority of international aid) goes to governments, in South Africa a 
substantial amount has gone directly to civil society organizations. Many aid agencies go so 
far as to require explicit quotas on funding to civil society. The Danish government, for 
instance, requires that 25 percent of aid go to civil society, as does the European Union. l3l 
Strengthening this sector has been a goal of foreign donors in the past, and continues to be so 
today. 
This chapter will provide an overview of foreign funding to South Africa today. First, 
it will examine funding to all sectors, as well as specifically to democracy assistance. Next it 
will identify characteristics of both public and private donors to South African civil society 
and identify basic trends that emerge from donors according to their country of origin. 
Finally, this chapter will discuss the types of domestic civil society groups that these foreign 
donors tend to support. 
Foreign Funding for South Africa's Development 
South Africa has long been a focus of international donors, and is one of the most 
highly-funded countries in Africa. In 1997, when official development assistance to the 
country peaked, it received R3.8 billion. 132 Donor interest has declined since that time, both 
129 Julie Hearn, "Aiding democracy? Donors and civil society in South Africa." Third World Quarterly, 21 :5, 
2000. ~19. 
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131 Lala Camerer. 'Terms of Endearment: Bilateral donor engagement in fighting corruption in South Africa" 
African Security Review Vol 9, No. 5/6, 2000. 











as confidence grew in the sustainability of South Africa's new government, and as a donor 
shift from bilateral to regional funding emerged. 133 Still, South Africa continues to receive 
several billion rand annually in official development assistance aid.134 Unlike other African 
countries where foreign aid makes up substantial part of the national budget, the strength of 
the South African economy has ensured that development assistance makes up a relatively 
small percentage of its overall gross domestic product (GDP). Even when foreign aid peaked 
in 1997, it still made up less than 2 percent of the national budget and 0.55 percent of the 
GOP.135 This reduces the influence of foreign donors over the state by ensuring that South 
Africa is less dependent on foreign sources to carry out its budget. 
Democracy assistance continued to make up an important part of foreign funding even 
after the transition to democracy in South Africa. In the period between 1994 and 1999, 
almost one-fifth of an estimated R18 billion in foreign aid went specifically for the goal of 
supporting good governance initiatives. 136 Figure 3 shows the breakdown of total foreign 
funding by sector. 














Foreign aid to civil society across all sectors represents about 20 percent of total 
funding to South Africa. Funding to this sector, however, is particularly constructive, as 100 
percent of funds given to South African civil society groups are grants, in contrast to 
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government assistance, which is often in the form of loans that must be paid back. 138 
Additional funding gets to South African civil society from aid channeled through the state as 
well. 
The most substantial foreign donors to South Africa are the European Union and the 
United States government, which together have donated nearly US$1 billion between 1994 
and 1999. 139 Significant bilateral donors to South Africa include the Netherlands, Germany, 
the Nordic countries, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Other official aid 
sources, such as the World Bank and Japan, have also supported South Africa's development, 
although they have done so primarily through technical assistance. Finally, foreign private 
foundations, such as the Ford Foundation and the Mott Foundation, have also been significant 
in providing funding to South Africa. 
All of these donors have put an emphasis on democracy and governance as a focus of 
their aid programs and have included funding toward civil society as part of their program 
disbursements. A new trend in civil society funding has emerged, however, as donors have 
begun to focus on funding civil society organizations specifically to work in partnership with 
the state. The focus of this funding has been primarily in the realm of social service 
proVIsIon. This new partnership-oriented funding is a significant emphasis for many foreign 
donors. The Dutch government, for instance, supports civil society-government collaboration 
because "government has taken the lead in the new South Africa and ... it does not make very 
much sense to undertake programmes which are in direct opposition to government.,,140 
Other foreign donors, such as the European Union require that all grants to civil society 
groups be approved by the South African government. 141 
This new trend is problematic for several reasons. First, with the increase of this 
emphasis, civil society groups can only successfully attain funding if they are in partnership 
with the government. In essence, government gets to approve which civil society groups and 
which projects receive funding. The sectors' goals and actions must thus be in line with the 
government, which minimizes civil society's pivotal watchdog role. Furthermore, with 
foreign donors' focus on partnership in the realm of service delivery, the only type of civil 
society organization that will be able to access funding will be those providing social 
IJ8 Kihato, 13. 
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serVices. This does not lead to the diverse, pluralistic civil society that is necessary for a 
healthy democracy. 
Public and Private Foreign Donors 
Two main types of foreign donors are players in civil society funding. The first is 
official donors. This category includes bilateral and multilateral aid agencies that distribute 
funding from governments. The second type is private grant makers and foundations that 
distribute money from non-governmental sources, such as endowments or individual 
donations. The distinction between these two types of donors is important, as donor priorities 
and strategies differ depending on the source of funding. 
Before 1994, both official and private donor agencies funded only civil society groups 
in South Africa. After that time, however, official donors took a much more active role in 
funding the South African government directly. Those civil society groups that do receive 
funding from bilateral or multilateral agencies are often given these funds with the 
expectation that they will work in collaboration with the government. Non-governmental 
donors, on the other hand, are more likely to support non-governmental groups in South 
African civil society. While official donors have distributed aid with a clear goal of 
influencing the political development and consolidation of democracy, private donors have 
been less focused on the "techniques of governance." 142 That being said, the sheer amount of 
funding that comes from official sources versus private sources means that official donors 
still comprise a larger source of civil society support than does the private sector. 
A hybrid type of donor agency has also emerged - that of non-governmental bodies 
that are funded almost entirely - if not entirely - by government. Often bilateral aid agencies 
will fund these groups, which then become a conduit for official development assistance to 
civil society in developing democracies. 143 Examples of this type of group include the 
National Endowment for Democracy in the United States, the Westminster Foundation for 
Democracy in the United Kingdom, and the political party foundations in Germany. 
Donor Origin Differences 
Official and non-governmental donors come from a variety of countries, with most 
funding coming from governmental sources. A few key groups have been particularly 
\,\2 Ibid., 27. 
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involved in funding civil society programs in South Africa over the years. Yet, even within 
the goal of civil society strengthening, funding priorities vary by country. 
The United States, for instance, puts a particularly strong emphasis on democracy 
assistance and civil society strengthening worldwide, including in South Africa. South Africa 
is the only African country - and one of only 15 countries total- to have received democracy 
assistance from USAID every year since the end of the Cold War. 144 Aid from the United 
States has focused on efforts to "improve the quality of governance" with an emphasis on 
ensuring the strength of the institutions of democracy. 145 Civil society is emphasized both to 
provide a check on government and to assist in carrying out the government's social welfare 
plan. 146 
Germany also has a significant civil society support program III South Africa, 
although its funding has been channeled almost entirely through its party foundations since 
the 1960s. These party foundations then disburse funds in line with their own political goals. 
Some, for instance, support political parties that have similar ideologies to their own. Others 
specialize in supporting a particular aspect of civil society, such as trade unions. 
The United Kingdom has structured its political aid to South Africa in a combination 
of both the United States' USAID and Germany's party foundation structure. The official 
government aid agency, the Department for International Development (DFID), has primarily 
supported the public sector, while the government-funded foundation, the Westminster 
Foundation for Democracy, has been the primary donor to South African civil society 
d 
. . 147 
a vocacy orgamzatIOns. 
Multilateral organizations have also contributed to South Africa's civil society 
development. As stated previously, the European Union has historically been one of the most 
influential players in democracy assistance to South Africa. The importance put on civil 
society is evidenced in its funding of the Foundation for Human Rights, which disburses 
funds exclusively to civil society organizations (as opposed to the government). The World 
Bank has also prioritized civil society and democracy building in its interactions with South 
144 Steven E Finkel, Anibal Perez-Linan, and Mitchell A. Seligson. "Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on 
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Africa. World Bank aid, however, is mainly in the form of technical assistance as opposed to 
direct grants. 
Types of Groups Supported 
Despite these differences, all foreign donors have tended to focus on a specific type of 
civil society group - formal and professionalized organizations. For the purposes of their 
funding, donors generally define civil society as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
that are elite, well-established, highly skilled, urban-based advocacy groups. These have 
been the recipients of the bulk of foreign funding in recent years. 148 Highly funded civil 
society groups include organizations such as IDASA, the South African Institute for Race 
Relations, and the Institute for Security Studies. 
Donors tend to support these professional NGOs in large part because they can 
identify with their ideologies and internal structures. Not only do they function in similar 
fashion to Western NGOs, but they also have similar interpretations of democracy and how it 
should be developed. 149 Moreover, these formal institutions are more likely to have the 
capacity to operate in compliance with foreign donors' general grantmaking processes -
including being able to keep updated financial records, write impact reports, and 
communicate quickly and easily. In contrast, many smaller, community-based organizations 
are not easily assessable by email or telephone, nor do they have the administrative 
experience to keep up with foreign donors' bureaucratic requirements. 
Within civil society funding, democracy-focused groups received the most donor 
support. These are groups that focus on the overall interaction between citizens and the state, 
as opposed to single-issue advocacy groups, such as women's organizations or human rights 
groups, which work for a narrower objective. ISO Julie Hearn, of the Institute of Development 
Studies, identifies five main categories of civil society organizations that were funded by 
foreign donors: democracy organizations; human rights and legal aid groups; conflict 
resolution agencies; organizations representing the non-government sector; and think tanks. 
Of these categories, democracy organizations were the most popular, as they received the 
most financial assistance and were supported by the broadest range of donors. lsl Elite, urban 
organizations receive the bulk of foreign funding, yet over half of the nearly 100,000 civil 
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society groups In South Africa are informal, community-based groupS.152 This myopIc 
funding pattern leaves the majority of groups unrepresented in the donors' version of civil 
society. 
A blanket statement presuming that donors ignore smaller, less formal organizations 
should not necessary be the final conclusion, however. Foreign non-governmental 
grant makers are placing greater focus on these smaller, local organizations, and a recent shift 
toward funding community-based organizations has begun.153 Furthermore, the pattern of 
funding a relatively small number of professional organizations does not mean that donors 
are not contributing to the country's democratic development. A recent study concluded that 
although civil society assistance is a relatively small portion of overall aid to South Africa, 
the groups that are funded are pivotal to democracy in the country. "Such groups are at the 
centre of shaping the most important questions facing [the country]: the type of economic 
policy to be pursued, the meaning and content of democracy, the form and power of local 
government, and the position of women in society.,,154 
Governmental and non-governmental donors play an important part In supporting 
civil society as an active force for democracy in South Africa. Although their funding styles 
are slightly different - with official donors focusing more on the state and private donors 
focusing more on civil society - both groups tend to support elite, formal NGOs that are 
focusing on democracy and governance promotion. 
Conclusion 
Foreign donors have long been involved in South Africa, and these funds have had a 
particularly strong focus on the development of a multi-racial democracy in the country. 
Within democracy assistance to the country, civil society groups have received an even more 
remarkable emphasis by donors that traditionally tend to give exclusively to governments. 
While the European Union and the United States government have historically been the 
largest donors to the country, many other donors throughout the world have made a 
significant impact as well. The impact of private grantmakers and foundations should not be 
discounted, however, especially in their support of civil society. There is little doubt that the 
efforts of both private and public donors have been felt in the transition and consolidation 
process of South Africa's democracy. 
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OFFICIAL DONOR GOALS AND RATIONALE: A CASE STUDY 
OF USAID IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The United States government is the financial leader in democracy assistance and 
civil society strengthening in South Africa and around the globe. Its development agency, the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID or 'the Agency') has 
distributed over US$5.5 billion to democracy and governance initiatives since its 
"Democracy Initiative" was launched in 1990.155 Democracy assistance is receiving 
increasing support from the United States, with funding rising from US$1 09 million in 1990 
to US$830 million in 2003. 156 U.S. bilateral aid to South Africa in particular has a long 
history of focusing on democracy and governance, with civil society strengthening being one 
of its major goals. 
This chapter will examine the relationship between the governments of the United 
States and South Africa both during and after apartheid. It will then explore USAID's donor 
program in South Africa, with a focus on its civil society strengthening initiatives. Finally, it 
will look at the Agency's goals and motivations in their support to South African civil society 
and compare those goals to the outcome of programs that actually received funding. 
USAID in Context 
The United States Agency for International Development is the organ of the U.S. 
government responsible for disbursing most non-military international aid. It operates with 
the purpose of "furthering America's foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and 
free markets while improving the lives of the citizens of the developing world.,,157 The 
Agency focuses its aid around economic growth, agriculture and trade; global health; and 
democracy, conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance, and carries out programs 
throughout Sub-Saharan Africa; Asia and the Near East; Latin American and the Caribbean; 
and Europe and Eurasia. 158 
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USAID was created with President Kennedy's enactment of the Foreign Assistance 
Act in 1961. 159 While this Agency was originally aimed primarily at encouraging economic 
development, it has since evolved with a large focus on democracy development. "During 
the 1980s, [USAID] developed programs to improve the administration of justice, the 
conduct of democratic elections, and the dialogue between civilians and the military.,,160 
These activities were formalized and expanded to include strengthening local governance and 
legislatures with the creation of a "Democracy Initiative" in December 1990, which made 
democracy promotion a major goal of the Agency. 161 Democracy and governance remain a 
major focus today. President George W. Bush's National Security Strategy cites three 
principal aims of both the Department of State and USAID - diplomacy, development, and 
defense. 162 The Department of State's Mission states its emphasis on democracy promotion: 
"In confronting the intersection of traditional and transnational challenges, [the Department 
of State and USAID] will combine our diplomatic skills and development assistance to act 
boldly to foster a more democratic and prosperous world integrated into the global economy." 
163 
USAID is the leading financial donor in terms of democracy assistance throughout the 
world, as well as South Africa in particular. 164 The Agency identifies four principal goals on 
which to focus its democracy assistance: rule of law; elections and political processes; civil 
society; and governance. 165 Because of the historical importance of South Africa's civil 
society, USAID has focused significant attention on this sector. The idea of civil society has 
long been embedded in U.S. political culture. Since De Tocqueville described an American 
government built on its civic culture, civil society has been accepted as a necessary 
component of a successful democracy, and the United States' aid reflects that belief. The 
Agency explains its policy toward civil society as follows: 
The hallmark of a free society is the ability of individuals to associate with like-
minded individuals, express their views publicly, openly debate public policy, and 
petition their government. 'Civil society' is an increasingly accepted term which best 
describes the non-governmental, not-for-profit, independent nature of this segment of 
society. In countries with fragile democratic traditions, the freedoms so necessary to 
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building and sustaining an active and independent civil society often are little 
understood, temporarily curtailed, or simply denied. USAID is working to strengthen 
commitment to an independent and politically active civil society in developing 
countries. 166 
USAID assistance to South Africa has focused specifically on democracy support 
since its beginnings when the apartheid government was still in power. USAID has stated, 
"The success of South Africa's transformation is one of the highest U.S. foreign policy 
objectives in Africa.,,167 While the U.S. has focused significant attention on the South 
African state, the relationship between the two governments has not always been smooth. 
US-South Africa Relations Under Apartheid 
The U.S. relationship with South Africa during apartheid was marked with confusion 
and mixed messages within both South Africa's White and non-White populations. Early on, 
the U.S. government was often supportive of the apartheid government. In 1969, for 
instance, the confidential National Security Study Memorandum 39 argued that the U.S. 
should become aligned with the white governments of Southern Africa, as their interests in 
terms of Southern Africa's minerals, location, and anti-communist tendencies were closely 
linked. 168 This sympathy for the apartheid government continued during the Cold War, when 
the U.S. often demonstrated backing for South Africa's struggle against its recently 
independent pro-communist neighbors in Africa. During the Carter administration, the U.S. 
vetoed proposed UN resolutions calling for economic sanctions against South Africa, and 
during the Reagan administration, the apartheid government under P.W. Botha was called an 
"ally and friend" by the American President. 169 
At the same time, the United States was undergoing its own racial transformation as 
the civil rights movement successfully took hold in the country. This emphasis on racial 
equality in the U.S. made it increasingly difficult to give even passive approval to the 
apartheid government. The American public was becoming increasingly vocal about their 
negative feelings toward the U.S. government's support of the oppressive and unequal 
apartheid regime. A turning point in the U.S. anti-apartheid campaign came in November 
1984, when an extended sit-in was executed at the South African Embassy in Washington, 
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DC. Three prominent supporters - Walter E. Fauntroy, a sitting member of Congress; 
Randall Robinson, president of TransAfrica, the African-American lobby on Africa; and 
Mary Berry, a leading black civil rights spokesperson - were arrested for their involvement in 
the demonstration. The protests continued for many months, which put a national spotlight 
on the South African situation. 170 
In 1982 President Reagan refused requests to veto a much-needed International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) loan to the apartheid government. Reagan again refused to rebuke the 
South African government when he vetoed a bill in 1985 to impose economic sanctions 
against South Africa. Finally, with increasing public outcry, Reagan issued Executive Order 
12532, which "banned US banks from extending new loans on South Africa and authorized 
US economic assistance as a viable alternative to sanctions as a means for undermining 
apartheid."l7l This was the first step in the official distancing of the U.S. government from 
the apartheid government. 
The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act 
In May 1986, the U.S. Congress drafted a bill that instructed USAID to "strengthen 
the leadership and institutions of the disadvantaged community so they can better respond to 
the legitimate needs of their constituencies.,,172 The bill easily passed in the House and the 
Senate, but was vetoed by President Reagan soon after. In an unprecedented move, the 
House and Senate overrode the veto to overwhelmingly pass the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act (CAAA or 'the Act') on October 2, 1986. 
The CAAA was extremely clear in its anti-apartheid aims, and a USAID office was 
established in South Africa (USAID/SA). USAID/SA's 1993 concept paper states: 
"USAID/South Africa is one of a very few Missions in which strategic goals are 
unambiguous and limited. The CAAA legislation is unequivocal about what our overriding 
goals should be: the dismantling of apartheid and the preparation of South Africa's 
disadvantaged population for a leadership role in a post-apartheid South Africa.,,173 The act 
called not only for sanctions against South Africa, but also for an aid program that was 
focused on political change, as opposed to economic or social development. 174 Notably, the 
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Act was specific about certain funding requirements, which impacted the way USAID 
established its office in the country. The CAAA prohibited funds from going to any 
government-related entities in South Africa. Instead, all funds were channeled through civil 
society, which was a drastic change from USAID's usual government-to-government 
bilateral aid arrangements. A second consequence of this civil society-focused funding was 
that USAID in South Africa under apartheid was set up more in the style of a private 
foundation than an official aid agency. Rather than working through a local government 
ministry or a contractor, USAID/SA disbursed and managed grants directly to non-
governmental groups.175 
USAID Beginnings in South Africa 
With the enactment of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986, USAID 
officially established its office in South Africa. Three months before the CAAA was even 
passed, a USAID staff person was sent to Pretoria to launch an in-country office. This was 
not, however, the first time the United States had an aid presence in South African 
development. A smaller, less robust aid program had been established in the country in the 
1970s. This program was almost entirely focused on scholarships for South African students 
to study at universities in the United States. 176 Because of the U.S.'s unclear relationship 
with the apartheid government, this program was met with understandable skepticism by both 
Black and White South Africans. This focus on education continued throughout apartheid, 
and this goal received the most funds through the transition until 1994. Of the close to 
US$540 million that was given between 1986 and 1994, more than US$21O million went 
toward education. 177 
The funding program in South Africa grew considerably - doubling in size everyone 
or two years. Table 2 shows the increases made in aid during the apartheid era. By 1994, 
over US$200 million was going toward development projects in the country. Throughout this 
time, the Agency focused on the anti-apartheid movement by funding not only education, but 
also community development and human rights groups. As the first democratic election in 
1994 neared, aid was increasingly being focused toward governance goals including voter 
education, election preparation, and political party development. 
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Throughout the entire apartheid era funding went exclusively to civil society groups. 
By 1986, about 50,000 civil society organizations were operating in South Africa. These 
groups, which included churches, labor unions, community-based organizations, and others, 
received funding from USAID for their pivotal role in the fight against apartheid. 179 While 
the purpose of this aid was to bring about an end to apartheid - not explicitly to strengthen 
civil society - the funds provided helped the sector develop and fulfill its democratic role. 
This is not to say, however, that USAID did not understand the importance civil society 
would play in any new democracy. "Already from the mid-1980s the USA had grasped the 
pivotal role that civil society would play in shaping the new South Africa. Subsequently, it 
began to attempt to influence it, checking the growing radicalism among the black population 
by developing counterweight forces conducive to the establishment of a liberal order.,,180 
These civil society grants were disbursed by USAID on an individual basis as unsolicited 
proposals came in from local and American organizations. The Agency was particularly 
receptive to the South African environment's changing needs, and it awarded funding 
accordingly. This hands-on approach was more labor-intensive than most USAID country 
programs, yet lasted throughout the transition. 
Funding the Transition to Democracy 
As South Africa's transition to a majority-rule government seemed more assured, 
USAID's presence in the country expanded. USAID funding grew from US$32.3 million in 
1990, when previously illegal groups like the ANC were unbanned, to US$211.7 million with 
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the elections in 1994. 181 With this increase in funding, grants also increased in size and 
scope. Many of these transition-period grants went to large, White-led, often U.S.-based 
NGOs, as USAID/SA started moving away from its foundation-style grantmaking. 
As the election approached, U.S. policy makers began to acknowledge that South 
Africa was changing, and the requirements laid out in the CAAA were not necessarily still 
applicable. In 1993 Congress passed the new South African Democratic Transition Support 
Act, which would repeal the CAAA on the day that a new government elected on a non-racial 
basis would take office in South Africa. 182 USAID/SA also revised their strategy to deal with 
the evolving political situation in South Africa. More funds were being directed to election 
monitoring, political party development, and voter education projects. Civil society'S role, 
however, still remained an emphasis, and the 1993 USAID/SA Strategy Concept Paper 
stated: 
... the South African NGO community is much more than simply a useful 
programming mechanism in the absence of a bilateral aid agreement; it also can 
help ensure accountability and honesty in whatever post-apartheid government 
emerges. In effect, it is the bedrock on which civil society is built. A strong 
network of indigenous NGOs, working outside of government, articulating diverse 
concerns and mobilizing individual communities, is thus an essential feature of 
our strategy and will continue to be a recipient of our funding. 183 
Although South Africa's transition to democracy led USAID to adjust its funding goals and 
strategy in the country, political transformation remained the key goal. 
USAID in Post-Apartheid South Africa 
With the first democratic elections in 1994, the CAAA had achieved its mission to 
help end apartheid. Yet USAID maintained a presence in the country to assist in the 
consolidation of democracy. Understandably, the Agency's strategies in South Africa shifted 
as its goals evolved. The South Africa Country Strategy Report drafted soon after the 
transition states: 
USAID/South Africa cannot hope to address all of the remaining challenges in the 
democracy and governance area given funding and time limitations ... Rather, 
USAID/South Africa's strategy is to focus on a limited number of long-term results 
which are important for sustainable development and democratic governance and 
which the Mission is confident it can accomplish within expected limits on funding 
and time. 184 
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This plan involved aiding the development of democratic processes so that USAID 
could exit the country confident that democracy would endure. Today, the Agency focuses 
its funding in South Africa on six strategic interests: democracy and governance, education, 
health and HIV/AIDS, economic capacity building, sustainable employment, and housing and 
local government. 185 
Accompanying this strategy change was a simultaneous operational change. Perhaps 
the most drastic change was the shift to provide funding directly to the South African 
government. No longer was funding going exclusively to civil society; with the shift to 
government funding also came the shift away from foundation-style operations. USAID/SA 
staff determined that this method of providing funding was too labor intensive and expensive. 
The 1995 Country Strategy Program explains: "USAID/SA and its partners have learned that 
changing entrenched ways of thinking, consolidating and rationalizing government 
institutions, and moving from policy formulation to implementation 'on the ground' is more 
complex and takes longer in South Africa than was initially anticipated.,,186 As a result, 
USAID/SA became more institutionalized and began working with large contractors, such as 
Creative Associates International, Inc. and PACT, to carry out their operations. This was met 
with some resistance from South African civil society groups that had grown accustomed to 
the previous style of direct interaction with USAID personnel in the country. 187 
Challenges to Post-Apartheid Funding 
USAID reworked their aid strategy 10 South Africa after the 1994 elections by 
drafting a Country Strategic Plan (CSP) for the years 1996-2005. USAID/SA identified 
several key challenges that would have to be addressed to achieve the country's goals of a 
functional, successful, and consolidated democracy. The first of these challenges was the 
social and economic structure left behind by apartheid. USAID/SA concluded: "Many of the 
inherited apartheid policies and practices, if left unchanged, will seriously jeopardize the 
capacity of the government to succeed in the social and economic transformation of the 
country.,,188 Secondly, South Africa's high birth rate was highlighted as a challenge. With a 
fertility rate of 4.1 at the time, the population was predicted to double in 30 years. 189 Third, 
economic conditions, including high income inequality and a GDP that shrank by 3.5 percent 
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<http://www.state.gov!s/d/rm/rls/dosstratI2004123503.htm> (12 July 2006). 
186 USAID. "USAID/South Africa Country Strategic Plan Amendment FY 2000 - 2005." February 2000, p 2-3. 
187 Aurora Associates and Creative Associations, xviii. 












during the transition (1989-1993), needed to be addressed in the new aid program. 190 
Finally, empowerment challenges, including civil service reform, redefining the role of civil 
society, increasing public participation in policymaking, and constitution reform, were 
identified. 191 
South Africa's evolving political, social, and economic climate evolved rapidly in the 
years following the transition to democracy. As such, an amendment was added to 
USAID/SA's strategy plan in 2000, based primarily on the new challenges that had 
developed in the five years prior. New challenges had emerged and old ones had either been 
dealt with or intensified. First, several problems had persisted that were detrimental to South 
Africa's economic and social development since the first Country Strategic Plan had been 
written. These included the intensification of HIV/AIDS, continued widespread 
unemployment, lower than expected foreign investment, and sustained high crime rates. 
Several unanticipated challenges also emerged in South Africa's political transformation, 
including the new recognition of "the complexity of transforming and managing new public 
sector systems, and the inadequacy of public service delivery."I92 Finally, the unexpected 
weakening of civil society after the transition was identified as a challenge requiring a re-
drafted country plan. 
Chief challenges today remam much the same as they were when the 2000 
amendment was added. USAID/SA identifies today's obstacles as including: sluggish 
economic growth and rising unemployment; high crime rate; high and rising HIV prevalence; 
and the challenge of service delivery. 193 In the area of democracy and governance, these key 
challenges are addressed by working to strengthen the criminal justice system, enhance local 
government's capacity to deliver social services, and push for partnerships between civil 
. d 194 SOCIety an government. 
Democracy and Governance in the New South African State 
Even after South Africa's transition, democracy remained high on the USAID agenda. 
In the post-transition years, political aid has made up between 20 percent (in 1997) to 42 
percent (from 2001 to 2003) of all U.S. assistance. 195 There were, however, major changes in 
the structure of the program once the first elections were carried out. First, the program could 
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no longer operate in a highly flexible, highly responsive manner. Long term goals, with 
specific targets had to be developed and carried out. Furthermore, funding processes were 
more institutionalized as USAID pushed for the use of outside contractors to help manage the 
program's activities. Less emphasis was placed on leadership development, which had been 
a major focus in the past. New focus was placed on civil society and government partnership 
development, human rights, conflict resolution, and governance. 196 
In the years following the transition, USAID/SA consulted with many civil society 
and government partners to develop the new democracy and governance program, launched 
in 2000. This program was developed to address three critical challenges identified as 
impediments to the consolidation of democracy: "high levels of crime; low local government 
capacity to deliver basic services; and a weakened civil society that does not engage 
effectively with the government.,,197 These remain the key foci of the program. 
Continued Emphasis on Civil Society 
Civil society strengthening remains a key goal of USAID's South Africa democracy 
and governance program. Civil society's role in "democratic pluralism and accountable 
government,,198 is key in its continued importance as part of democracy assistance. Civil 
society has been so instrumental in USAID/SA's democracy program, that evaluations of the 
program have concluded that USAID work to create civil society in countries that lack such a 
sector "as a prerequisite to providing heavy assistance of other types.,,199 
From the time the transition was over, USAID/SA began to move away from the 
foundation-style grantmaking it previously employed to working primarily through 
intermediaries. In 1998, the civil society initiative employed Creative Associations 
International, Inc to carry out the logistics of the program - soliciting and awarding grants, 
administration, technical oversight, etc. - which USAID continued to lead the overall 
program planning, management, and reporting requirements. 2oo This relationship lasted until 
2004, when a new contract was signed with PACT and Idasa to carry out similar 
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While civil society groups can receive funds through all USAID/SA offices - health, 
education, etc. - the democracy and governance initiative is specifically focused on 
strengthening the sector, as opposed to funding civil society groups for service delivery. 
USAID/SA recognized the strength of South Africa's civil society during the apartheid era 
and identified the post-apartheid challenge to adapt the existing civil society to the new needs 
for social service delivery and participation in the new democracy. The CSP drafted after the 
transition identified four over-arching themes for the country's new aid program. One was 
civil society emphasis, which USAID/SA planned to address by "working with and through 
[civil society organizations (CSOs)], both as a way of accomplishing effective interventions 
and as a way of promoting sustainable democracy.,,202 Leadership development was no 
longer a priority. Rather, assisting civil society efforts to work with government became a 
new priority for the Agency. The CSP amendment in 2000 specifically identified four key 
components of the civil society strengthening program: 
1) Improve CSO and government capacity to partner; 
2) Facilitate information sharing among CSOs, government, and donors about 
potential partnerships; 
3) Strengthen the enabling policy and donor environments for CSO development; 
and 
4) Strengthen research and dissemination on a broader range of topics related to civil 
society and its role in democratic consolidation. 203 
Chief among these is the increased emphasis on government and civil society 
partnerships, with the program's 2000 progress report citing that "the main goal of this new 
approach is to strengthen strategic CSO-government partnerships for service delivery and 
policy implementation." This remains the goal of the program today. This first became a 
priority in the years after 1994 as government struggled to accomplish its own development 
plan for the country. The need to partner with non-governmental and community-based 
organizations in order to carry out these goals was recognized by both the South African and 
United States governments. This partnership emphasis also resulted from civil society new 
weakened position following the transition, and the recognition that in order to survive in the 
new political environment, civil society would have to adapt in a collaborative way. The 
USAID/SA 2000 progress report stated "as CSO funding sources diminish, the sustainability 
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of local organizations increasingly depends upon their ability to design and deliver programs 
relevant to the national developmental agenda.,,204 
From leadership development to government partnerships, USAID's civil society 
program has evolved with the changing needs of the South African state. Throughout the 
evolution of the donor program, however, civil society has remained a key strategic goal of 
democracy development in the country. 
USAID/SA Goals and Rationale 
In order to understand the programs that were supported and the funding that was 
allocated by USAID/SA, the overall goals of the program must be examined. South Africa is 
considered an upper-middle income country, and therefore would not be eligible for U.S. 
':' . d l' 705 loreIgn aSSIstance un er norma cIrcumstances.- The country's unique political 
circumstances brought USAID into the country, and continue to keep the Agency there. For 
this reason, the overall goal of the program has not historically been to assist in economic and 
social development, but rather to assist in political development. USAID believes the 
necessary resources for development are already present in the country. As such, its role is 
interpreted more as an enabler of democratic transition and consolidation. USAID's 1993 
Strategy Concept Paper states: "Our role is to facilitate South Africa's response to its 
challenges through human capacity development to enable the most efficacious use of its 
resources.,,206 
Prior to 1994, the Agency's presence in South Africa had a very clear goal - to help 
bring about the end of apartheid. The CAAA legislation that gave USAID/SA its mandate 
stated distinctly that "United States policy toward the Government of South Africa shall be 
designed to bring about reforms in that system of government that will lead to the 
establishment of a nonracial democracy.,,207 Overall program strategies for the country 
shifted as the political situation evolved and as new challenges, including HIV/AIDS, 
increasing crime rates, and high unemployment, were identified as new threats. Through the 
evolution of South Africa's political environment, however, USAID/SA's goal remained 
relatively the same - to aid in South Africa's transition to ensure a successful, democratic 
2114 USAID. "News Flash: Civil Society Program Design Progress Report," 1. 
2()5 Hearn. "Aiding democracy?" 819. 
2()6 USAID/SA 1993 Concept Paper in Aurora Associates and Creative Associations, 87. 











state. Even today, USAID says, "The success of South Africa's transformation is one of the 
highest U.S. foreign policy objectives in Africa.,,:w8 
While some donors were planning exit strategies in the years following South Africa's 
transition to democracy, USAID remained in the country. The Agency recognized that while 
the transition had occurred, democracy had not yet been consolidated in the country. While 
democratic processes may be solidifying in South Africa, democratic culture remains weak. 
Results to South Africa's Afrobarometer survey, released in 2003, find that less than one half 
(47 percent) of South Africans believe that the country is "fully or largely democratic.,,209 
Trust in political institutions remain even lower, with only 37 percent saying they trust the 
President, 31 percent saying they trust Parliament, and only 24 percent trusting local 
government. 210 Recognizing that South Africa's democracy was far from consolidated, 
USAID/SA's CSP amendment in 2000 wrote: 
Despite the success of South Africa's democratic transition, the country faces several 
challenging constraints if it is to consolidate its emergent democracy. At the heart of 
these is the limited capacity of the state to cement a 'social contract' with society, in 
which government protects the rights of, and delivers services to, citizens who, in turn, 
meet their obligations and are committed to democratic government. 211 
Why does South Africa's democracy retain such an importance for USAID even after 
the CAAA's original goal of ending apartheid was accomplished? As mentioned previously, 
South Africa's importance and economic strength in the region make it a particularly 
strategic country for U.S. interests. As well as being a major U.S. trading partner, South 
Africa also plays an important role in regional bodies such as the African Union, the New 
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and the South African Customs Union 
(SACU). USAID/SA's 2004 annual report explains South Africa's strategic importance for 
the United States: 
"South Africa remains critical to U.S. foreign policy interests and plays a key 
economic and political role in Africa bilaterally and regionally as an active member of 
regional bodies ... South Africa has been actively engaged in efforts to peacefully 
resolve conflicts in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, and Burundi and most recently in Zimbabwe. South Africa remains by far 
20S USAID. "Country Strategic Plan," USAID South Africa Mission, 
<http://www.usaid.gov/missions/sa/uspart2.htmi> (12 July 2006). 
209 Robert Mattes, Christiaan Keulder, Annie B Chikwana, Cherrel Africa, and Yull Derek Davids. "Democratic 
Governance in South Africa: The People's View." Afrobarometer Paper No. 24. January 2003. 
<http://w\\, w .afrobarnmeter. org/papers/AfropaperN 024. pd 1>, v. 
211l Ibid .. iv. 











the most important U.S. trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa, excluding Nigeria, a 
"1 ,,717 major 01 exporter. - -
For USAID, democracy and governance - and civil society in particular - play an 
important role in helping the U.S. government to achieve its overall goal of a stable South 
Africa that is strong enough to manage regional problems and friendly enough to collaborate 
with U.S. interests. USAID in Washington's underlying rationale for supporting democracy 
and governance initiative is easily applied to USAID/SA's overall goals: 
Expanding democracy improves individual opportunity for prosperity and improved 
well-being, thus contributing to the more traditional goals of the Agency. The 
strategic long-term domestic and foreign policy objectives of the United States are 
best served by enlarging the community of democratic nations worldwide. 
Establishing democratic institutions, free and open markets, an informed and educated 
populace, a vibrant civil society, and a relationship between state and society that 
encourages pluralism, participation, and peaceful conflict resolution - all of these 
contribute to the goal of establishing sustainable democracies. 213 
Supporting South Africa's democratic development has been a strategic investment for 
USAID and its support for civil society has been key in its strategy of achieving the goal of a 
fully democratized South Africa. 
Conclusion 
Since the mid-1980s, USAID has participated extensively in South Africa's transition 
and consolidation process. The Agency has chosen to highlight political development as one 
of its key goals throughout this period. Overall, USAID/SA has been relatively consistent in 
its goals. The program has worked to aid the transformation and stability of South Africa's 
democracy. Civil society has played a particularly important part in achieving this goal. This 
was first a result of USAID's restriction on funding government bodies. However, civil 
society remained a priority even after South Africa's transition to majority-rule government, 
as a necessary component to boost democratic development. 
The programs USAID supported appear to have had an impact on the development of 
the country. While analyzing the impact of USAID's funding is outside scope of this paper, a 
brief overview of outside studies on this topic appears to have positive results. A 1995 
evaluation by Aurora Associates and Creative Associates International, Inc. conclude: 
In the category of political development there is widespread agreement that USAID 
facilitated political change and empowerment of persons legally disadvantaged by 
apartheid. Seventy-five percent of survey respondents agreed that USAID made a 
1[) . 
- - USAID, "South Afnca FY2004 Annual Report," I July 2004, 3-4. 
<http://pdf.dec.org/pJf docs/PDACA045.pdf> 











considerable contribution to black political empowerment through programs such as 
human rights and legal aid, civic assistance, and community and democratic 
development. 214 
Despite past successes, the goals of the U.S. Agency for International Development 
remain the same in South Africa. Challenges persist that threaten the country's young 
democracy, including HIV/AIDS, continued high unemployment, failure in service delivery 
(housing), and high crime rates. The Agency continues to address these challenges and work 
for a democratic and stable South Africa in order to boost South Africa's position as a U.S. 
ally and a regional leader in Africa. 












PRIV ATE DONOR FUNDING TRENDS: A CASE STUDY OF THE MOTT 
FOUNDATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Foreign funding from private sources also played a large role in civil society and 
South Africa's democratic development. Private foundations, such as the Ford Foundation, 
the Kellogg Foundation, and the Mott Foundation, have been involved in funding 
organizations working toward a democratic South Africa for as long as many government-
sponsored aid agencies. While the overall goals of the public and private donors have been 
relatively similar - to usher in a democratic South African government and ensure its success 
- the funding methods that these two groups have employed have differed as their 
motivations, goals, and rationale for funding has differed. Because private foundations do 
not face the same constraints as government donors, they often do not follow typical patterns 
of civil society funding. 
This chapter will examine one of these private donors - the Mott Foundation - to gain 
an understanding of the motivations behind the Foundation's involvement in South Africa. 
This chapter will then examine all grants disbursed through the Foundation's South Africa 
civil society program since the end of apartheid in order to identify trends and evaluate 
whether the Foundation's funding has been consistent with its goals. 
Introduction to the Mott Foundation 
The Mott Foundation is a U.S.-based foundation founded by Charles Stewart Mott, 
former Vice President of General Motors (GM) and three-time mayor of Flint, Michigan. 
The Foundation was established in 1926 primarily to address issues of the local community in 
Flint. The founder explained his motivations: 
It seems to me that every person, always, is in a kind of informal partnership with his 
community. His own success is dependent to a large degree on that community, and 
the community, after all, is the sum total of the individuals who make it up ... So broad 
and so deep are the objectives of the Mott Foundation that they touch almost every 
aspect of living, increasing the capacity for accomplishment, the appreciation of 
values, and the understanding of the forces that make up the world we live in. In this 
sense, it may truly be called a Foundation for Living - with the ultimate aim of 
d I . d d· 71S eve OpIng greater un erstan Ing among men. - . 
215 Mott Foundation. "2004 Annual Report: Reaching Across Boundaries." Charles Stewart Matt Foundation. 

























This main belief in the importance of community has guided the Foundation's grant making 
since its beginnings and continues to be the guiding principle today. In the past 80 years, 
however, the scope of the Foundation's work has expanded outside the local area to support 
efforts throughout the United States and the rest of the world. While contributing to the Flint 
area remains one of the Foundation's main programs, four other foci have been added: civil 
society, environment, pathways out of poverty, and exploratory & special projects. These 
initiatives are part of the overall mission "to support efforts that promote a just, equitable and 
sustainable society.,,217 The Mott Foundation's budget is broken down by each initiative in 
Figure 4. 
The Mott Foundation and Civil Society 
An emphasis on civil society support stemmed from C.S. Mott's belief regarding the 
link between individual and community success. The Mott Foundation sees society as 
consisting of three components: the government sphere; the business sphere; and the non-
profit sphere. Through its civil society funding program the Foundation supports the third 
sphere, with an emphasis on non-profit charitable and voluntary organizations. The 
Foundation's working definition describes civil society as: 
216 Ibid. 











218 those communities and 
societies where democracy, 
freedom, inclusiveness and 
opportunity are embraced by 
and for all citizens. In these 
communities and societies, 
cItIzens are engaged and 
empowered; their voices are 
heard; and public, private, and 
nonprofit sectors are 
accountable and cooperative in 
f · . ,,?19 support 0 a Just society. -
Like many civil society donors, 
Mott's overall goal for its civil society 
program IS based on supporting 
democracy with an emphasis on strong 
communities, access to resources, 
h . h d d· . ??O G uman ng ts, an Iversity. -- rants 
are awarded based on an overall 221 
TABLE 3: 
The Mott Foundation's fundamental principles of 
civil society: 
• a belief in the inherent worth and dignity of the 
individual; 
• a commitment to self-determination for individuals 
and local communities: 
• respect for, and protection of, individual and group 
rights and freedoms, including equal opportunity to 
pursue goals and participate in society without 
discrimination: 
• caring about the CIlJltrT10ll gChlJ by individuals and 
groups (If individuals looking beyond themsdves; 
• acceptance and pursuit of democratic values and 
practices, and rule uf law as a means to ensure a fair. 
equitable andJuq society: 
• the impurtance of Individual participation and civic 
responsibi I ity: 
• respect for diversity. the practice of pluralism, ancl 
the capacity and \villingne<;s to resolve dispute~ 
peacefully; and 
• a belief in the need for ('penness, responsiveness and 
accountability of governmental, business and non-
profit instituti(llh 
belief that all individuals should be able to participate in the decisions that affect themselves 
and their communities. In order for this to be accomplished, all sectors of society should be 
transparent, accountable, and open. Since 1989, the Foundation has worked toward these 
beliefs by addressing three principle foci: strengthening the nonprofit sector; promoting 
rights, responsibilities and participation; and improving race and ethnic relations. 222 With 
these foci in mind, a diversity of organizations receive funding. Mott describes their grantees 
as organizations that "frequently cross cultural, racial, political and language boundaries in 
their efforts to deepen democracy, strengthen communities, build the non-profit sector, and 
f . h d d· . 223 ensure respect 0 ng ts an Iversity. 
The Mott Foundation's Civil Society Program is its second largest (after Pathways out 
of Poverty), with almost US$27 million in grants disbursed in 2004 alone. These grants are 
centered on four geographic areas: CentrallEastem Europe and Russia (which receives 48.7 
218 Mott Foundation. "Civil Society: Philosophy, Programs, and Procedures." Charles Stewart Mott Foundation. 
October 2003 <http://mott.org/publications/pdflP32003CS.pdf> (8 July 2006). 
219 Mott Foundation, "Civil Society Program - Frequently Asked Questions," c.s. Mott Foundation, 
<http://mott.org/fag.asp'!criteria=Civil+Societv > (8 July 2006). 
221) Mott, "2004 Annual Report," 14. 
221 Mott Foundation. "Civil Society: Philosophy, Programs, and Procedures.·· Charles Stewart Mott Foundation. 
October 2003 <http://mott.org/publicatiPJls/pdti'P32003CS.pdf> (8 July 2006). 
222 Mott Foundation, "Civil Society Program - South Africa," c.s. Matt Foundation, 
<http://www.mott.org/programs/cs-sa.asp> (8 July 2006). 











percent of total funds); the United States (25.2 percent); South Africa (18.8 percent); and 
International Initiatives (7.3 percent).224 
The Mott Foundation in South Africa 
The Mott Foundation became involved in South Africa in the late 1980s. As 
democracy began to spread rapidly throughout Africa and the former Soviet Union, there was 
a general feeling within the Foundation that civil society should be an important part of this 
change. The Foundation's South Africa Program Director Russell Ally explained that the 
belief that ordinary people and communities could participate in the process of democracy by 
influencing, advocating, and holding government accountable led to the creation of the South 
African civil society programs. Rather than focusing on a specific issue, such as health, 
education, or gender equality, the intent was to focus on strengthening the non-profit sector in 
the country in order to affect the overall process of development.:m The Foundation explains 
its emphasis on civil society to support democratic development: 
Given the development challenges faced by government, the role of civil society is 
even more critical. Many nonprofit organizations partner with government to improve 
service delivery and the quality of life for the majority of the population. Other 
nonprofits see themselves as independent watchdogs, and see a need for civil society 
to monitor government by engaging in policy formulation and implementation. The 
nonprofit sector can act as a critical independent voice and an advocate for local 
community needs, and can ensure that resources allocated to the sector itself and 
toward poverty alleviation are used effectively.226 
Funding specifically to South Africa began in the 1980s as economic sanctions 
against the country mounted. Because of the strong connections between Mott and General 
Motors, the Foundation decided to begin funding organizations in South Africa when GM 
made the decision to pull out of the country. Education was the initial focus of Mott's 
involvement, with the goal of preparing disadvantaged, mainly Black, students for the 
transition to democracy. Despite this early focus on education, there had always been an 
emphasis on funding civil society groups and strengthening the sector as a whole. Until the 
transition to democracy in 1994, the Mott Foundation funded civil society in two forms. 
First, it attempted to strengthen individual community groups by providing direct funding. 
Second, it attempted to strengthen the whole sector by providing funding specifically to 
22.1 Mott, "2004 Annual Report," introduction. 
225 Ally, Russell, South Africa director, Mott Foundation, phone interview by the author, II July 2006. 











support indigenous, Black-led groups, to encourage private philanthropy in South Africa, and 
to encourage exchange with US-based organizations. 227 
After the 1994 elections the program was organized into three separate subgroups: 
democracy education (to encourage citizen participation); women's participation (to enable 
women's leadership development); and the non-profit sector (to create an environment for 
financial sustainability and networking for domestic non-profits). 228 In 1998, the Board 
approved a new plan for the Foundation's civil society program, with the common objective 
of strengthening the non-profit sector. The particular emphasis was on promoting local 
philanthropy, including community foundations, workplace gIvmg programs, and 
government legislation that encourages individual giving. 229 The South African program was 
then re-focused around two subgroups: supporting the non-profit sector and supporting 
citizen rights and responsibilities. This focus was refined the following year with the 
additional goal of improving race relations. 23o Despite shifting challenges in the political, 
social, and economic development of the country (including high crime rates, the rapid 
spread of HIV / AIDS, and elevated unemployment), the goals of the South African civil 
society program have remained relati vel y unchanged since 1999. 
231 
Table 4: Key Objectives of the Mott Foundation's South Africa Civil Society program: 
• NONPROFIT SECTOR AND PHILANTHROPY: Building a more effective and well-
managed nonprofit sector that is engaged with issues of poverty and inequality and that is 
adequately resources through public and private funding. 
• RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND PARTICIPATION: Strengthening people's engagement 
with local community structures and increasing public participation in decisionmaking 
processes to ensure that people's rights are upheld, advanced and fulfilled. 
• RACE AND ETHNIC RELA nONS: Enhancing the ability of nonprofit organizations and 
local communities to better address racism and discrimination, and to promote justice and 
reconciliation. 
227 Stacey, Simon and Sada Aksartova. "The Foundation of Democracy: U.S. Foundation Support for Civil 
Society in South Africa, 1988-96," Voluntas: International Journal o/Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 
12:4, December 200 1,381. 
228 Ibid., 38\. 
229 Mott Foundation. "1998 Annual Report - Civil Society: Developing Philanthropy." Charles Stewart Mott 
Foundation. <http://mott.org/publications/websites/ Annual I 998/deve\opin!!.html> (8 July 2006). 
23oMott Foundation. "1999 Annual Report - Civil Society: South Africa." Charles Stewart Molt Foundation. 
<http://mott.org/publications!wcbsites!Annual 1991)/c~··safrica.asp> (8 July 2006). 











Mott Foundation Grants 
The Mott Foundation has consistently provided grants to South African civil society 
groups for almost two decades. In the 11 years following the first democratic election in 
1994, the Foundation has donated almost US$46 million to strengthen civil society in South 
Africa. As a private foundation, Mott did not have the political baggage that official donors, 
such as USAID, had to contend with in their grantmaking. The Foundation did not have to 
concern itself with the economic or diplomatic implications of its funding on government 
relations. Rather, it could formulate its strategy in line with its general funding philosophy 
without having to factor in conflicting priorities from politicians, taxpayers, development 
experts, and other interested parties. As a result, the Foundation's South Africa funding did 
not follow the same pattern as the majority of official donors' grantmaking. Whereas most 
democracy donors in South Africa redirected their funding from civil society to government 
following the transition to democracy, the Mott Foundation continued to fund civil society as 
its main priority. The following section analyzes the grants made by the Mott Foundation 
from 1994 until 2005 to understand the scope, nature, and breadth of its civil society program 
in South Africa and to determine whether the Foundation's grantmaking was consistent with 
its goals. 
All grants beginning between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 2005 were included 
in this survey. This period was selected as it consistently covers the post-apartheid period, 
starting with the beginning of the year of the first multi-racial elections and ending at the year 
with the most complete available grant data. This sample included 407 grants totaling 
US$45,764,388. These grants were then labeled by the purpose of the grant and the chief 
issue addressed. Under purpose, each grant was assigned one of six labels, listed below with 
descri pti ons. 
Table 5: Grant Labels - Purpose 
Funding pays for a range of activities including publications, 
conferences, government meetings, research, and training 
with the overall goal of raising awareness for a particular 
Advocacy Issue. 
Funding supports educational activities (trainings, 
workshops, meetings, etc.) that are aimed at familiarizing 
the general population with issues that directly pertain to 
Civic democracy and governance, including elections, citizen 











Funding pays for scholarships, vocational training, literacy 
programs, and other instruction that do not directly pertain to 
Education democracy. 
Funding pays for general costs of running the organization, 
including salaries, overhead, building development, 
Operations endowments, and general budget deficiencies. 
Funding pays for research, project evaluation, academic 
Research reports, or building capacity for research. 
Service Funding supports the organization's ability to provide social 
Provision services to their constituents. 
Under chief issue addressed, one of 13 labels was assigned to each grant, with descriptions 
below. 
Table 6: Grant Labels - Chief Issue Addressed 
Funding supports programs that assist adults in 
Adult furthering their own education, including adult 
Training_ literacy and vocational training. 
Activities support the transition to and the 
consolidation of democracy, including issues 
such as elections, local government, and budget 
Democracy processes. 
Funding is aimed at increasing diversity in civil 
society, including racial diversity, gender 
Diversity diversity, and organizational diversity. 
Funding supports initiatives aimed at creating 
gender equality, including women's leadership 
Gender training and education. 
Activities are aimed at improving public health, 
including access to clean water, health care, and 
Health HIV / AIDS prevention and treatment. 
Supports activities aimed at lessening economic 
Poverty poverty. 
Race Funding is aimed at improving racial and ethnic 
Relations tensions. 
Activities are supported that pertain to 
decreasing violence, aiding the transition 
Reconciliation process, and supporting reconciliation. 
Supports access to and education of human 
Rights rights, including access to legal rights. 
Activities receive funding specifically to 
Sector strengthen the non .... profit sector. 
Supports and advocates for the practice of 
Volunteer volunteerism. 
Funding supports activities that empower or help 
Youth develop South Africa's youth. 
This category is applied to any grant that falls 











Profile of Mott Foundation Grants 
As discussed in earlier chapters, general civil society funding trends saw donors 
shifting away from the sector in 1994, opting instead to fund government initiatives. Private 
funding did not necessarily follow this pattern, and the Mott Foundation is one such donor 
that bucks this trend. While civil society funding started off relatively low in 1994 (US$1.1 
million), funding rose steadily, averaging out at about US$5 million per year, with a huge 
jump in funding between 1998 and 2000. Figure 5 illustrates this trend. This further goes 
against common funding patterns, 
where many donors dropped 
funding to civil society following 
Former President Mandela's 
speech ill Mafikeng decrying 
groups that "act as instruments of 
foreign governments and 
institutions that fund them to 
promote the interests of these 
external forces. ,,232 





The number of grants also rose steadily since 1994, with a slight drop after 1997, and 
again after 2002, as illustrated in Figure 6. Figure 7 shows that average grant size was less 
steady as it peaked at about US$175,000 in 2000, and then dropped again. 
t-llmber of Grants per Year 
70 .---~._. __ ~ ..... " ·_"'_·"_.m." .... ~ .... __ "_m_. __ ~ •• 
W~~-~--~-------.~~ 
50~-------------,~-r----4 




0+--__ ------__ --~--__ ~~--r_~_4 
F· 6114 Igure -. 
Average Grant Size per Year 










$O+----__ ~~--r_------~ __ ~___i 
Figure 7235 
m Nelson Mandela. 1997, Report by the President of the ANC to the 5(/" Natinoal Conference of the African 
National Congress, Mafikeng, South Africa: Speech. 
<http://www.anc.om.zaJancdocs/speechesI1997/sp 1216.html> (25 April 2006). 
213 Data aggregated from Mott Foundation, "Grants Database," C.S. Mott Foundation, 











Although the average grant size for the entire period was US$116,466, there were 
grants of significantly larger and smaller sizes. The largest grant by far (US$2 million) went 
to the Nelson Mandela Children's Fund to assist in the creation of an endowment. The next 
largest grant was half the size (US$1 million) and went to the International Fundraising 
Consortium in 2001 to help the non-profit sector address the challenges of HIV/AIDS. There 
was no established trend in terms of which issues received larger amounts of funding, 
although these large grants often went to fund general operations. The smallest grants (four 
grants under US$10,000) were primarily awarded for research pertaining to the non-profit 
sector. 
Most grants were awarded for a period of 24 months. The longest grant awarded in 
this period was 60 months, which went to the Foundation for Community Development to 
strengthen civil society in Mozarnbique.236 There was no particular grant purpose that was 
awarded for a longer time period. The top four grants in length were for advocacy (60 
months), operations (52 months), civic education (52 months), and research (52 months). 
Mott Grantees 
The 407 grants that were awarded under the South Africa civil society program during 
the period examined went to 159 separate organizations, based almost exclusively in South 
Africa. The average total grant amount per organization was US$287,575, although the 
median grant total was lower, with most organizations receiving about US$150,000. During 
this period, each organization received an average of 2.5 grants. 
Each organization was funded for an average of 4 years and 3 months. Some 
organizations, however, were funded for well over that amount, with a few groups assisted 
during the entire period studied. Universities and non-profit associations received funding 
for the longest period of time. The University of the Western Cape, for instance, received 
funding during the extent of the period studied for a variety of activities including education, 
civic education, research and advocacy. Most of the funds went to democracy initiatives (5 
out of 9 grants). Another academic institution, the University of Cape Town, also received 
consistent funding from the Mott Foundation. The University of Cape Town has been 
supported since 1995 for 14 separate grants primarily for civic education and research, 
2.1~ Data aggregated from Mott Foundation, "Grants Database." 
235 Ibid. 
236 In 2001, two civil society organizations in Mozambique were awarded grants from the Mott Foundation's 
South Africa office. These grants went to strengthen civil society in Mozambique. The remainder of the 407 











focusing on a large range of themes. Also receiving consistent funding since 1995 were the 
Southern African NGO Network, the Community Development Resource Association, and 
the Southern African Grantmakers Association, which all dealt almost exclusively with 
strengthening the NGO sector through a variety of activities (education, advocacy, research, 
etc.). 
Grants were distributed primarily to organizations based in South Africa's top five 
urban areas (Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban and Port Elizabeth). This was 
followed by grants to U.S.-based organizations, with only a few awarded to African 
organizations outside of South Africa's urban centers (two of these grants went to 
organizations in Mozambique), as shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8237 
Within those grants distributed to urban areas, the vast majority went organizations 
based in Johannesburg and Cape Town, with very few grants given to organizations based 
outside of South Africa's top five cities. This trend remained relatively constant throughout 
the period examined. 
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Figure 9238 
This pattern of funding primarily urban-based organizations is similar across the 
board of foreign donors to civil society. Amongst both public and private donors, funding 
urban-based organizations is the norm. A study of private foundation funding to civil society 
in South Africa found that the vast majority of private grants (including those from the Mott 
Foundation) went not only to urban-based organizations, but also professionalized 
organizations both before and after apartheid. The study concluded that "Official civil 
society aid tends to focus on professionalized organizations ... the dominant practice of U.S. 
foundations when supporting American social movement organizations is [also] to fund 
~ . 1 ,,')'19 prolesslOna ones. --
Grant Purpose 
Grants were split fairly evenly between a variety of activities, as shown in Figure 10. 
Grants supporting advocacy initiatives received the most number of grants overall (29 
percent), followed by operational grants (22 percent), then research, education, and civic 
education project split fairly evenly (13 - 18 percent). Grants supporting service provision 
were not common, making up just 3 percent of all grants. 
238 Data aggregated from Mott Foundation, "Grants Database." 








































When split by overall funding, as In Figure 11, the division is fairly equal to the 
division by number of grants, implying that average grant size was similar across the board. 
Grants supporting general operations were largest (US$138,776) followed by civic education 
grants (US$125,556), then advocacy grants (US$113,696). Funds to advocacy activities were 
most common both in terms of the number of grants given and in terms of the amount of 
funds given. Funds for research received the least amount of money, despite the fact that 
research grants were the second most common type (after advocacy). 
Table 7: Mott Foundation Grant by Purpose242 
Total Average 
amount Grant 
(in US$) (in US$) 
Advocacy $13,529,781 $113,696 
Civic 
Education $6,654,422 $125,556 
Education $6,147,343 $99,151 
Operations $12,351,060 $138,776 
Research $5,959,975 $81,643 
Service 
Provision $1,121,787 $10 1 ,981 
2~() Data aggregated from Mott Foundation, "Grants Database." 





















When examined longitudinally (see Figures 12-17), it is possible to see that advocacy 
grants had a fairly upward turn in general with a drop in recent years. Civic education grants 
dropped considerably, with substantial spikes around election years. However, overall, 
grants followed a fairly consistent pattern. Most of these graphs show consistent spikes and 
drops throughout the period examined. As determined earlier, grants were most commonly 
awarded for a two-year period. Often, once the initial two years were completed, a second 
grant for two additional years was awarded, which may explain these bi-annual spikes. 




. I 60% 
Civic Education as Percentage of Overall Grants 1994· 
2005 
I ' 50% 50% j-.~.~----~-~-~-----~ 
40% +----------~""""::----~--' '. I 40% 
30°', \-----;;,>""".----+----.3100-=:-----: I '. 30% +--~'-"----...f--1~--------___I 
20~;0 -t--,---#----'!k---",r:::.'-----------""'--" II 20% H~-+--I--+~~--------i 
10% +--~~-----=_-----------e . 110% ,------"'-------"--"\:::::;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;"'1 
0% L-_____ - ____ --_-_--_-' I, 0% L-____________ -_~___I 
~~*~~~~~~~~~ I ~~*~~~~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~.~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
___________ ~.___ __~I ___ ~__ ~ ___ . ____ J 
Figure 12243 Figure 13244 
--Ed-~cation Gr~nts as Percentage of Overall Grants - ---I !-~-operations ~rants as Percentage of Overall Grants --l 
1994-2005 I 1994-2005 
60% 
50% +--_____________ -i1 I 
F" 1474S Igure ---
-~-- ------._--------
Research Grants as Percentage of Overall Grants 1994· 
2005 1 I 
::: +-______ "_. "._" ..... _.--_--_"_" .. _ ...._--_.-_w._ ..-_~_-._-._ .._--.. _. __ .~._, I I 
::: j-__________________ ~J I ! 
20% , I 










,o,~ ,~'0 ,0,0,'0 ,0,0,'\ ,0,0,'0 ,0,0,0, 'l,rSP 'l,<::><::>' rf><::>'l, 'l,<S>'" 'l,# 'l,<::><::>'0 .1 
60% 
F" 15746 Igure -

















Chief Issues Addressed 
Organizations specifically targeting the non-profit sector received the vast majority of 
grants from the Mott Foundation during this period (see Figure 18). Grants addressing this 
issue made up almost a third of total grants, with the 12 other issues making up the other two-
thirds. Organizations addressing democracy came in second with 69 grants, followed by 













Funding to strengthen the non-profit sector received the most overall money, as well 
as the most number of grants, followed by democracy-focused grants, and grants focusing on 
gender issues. However, none of these issues were on top in terms of average grant size. 
Grants focusing on youth, health issues, and elections topped the list with largest average 
grant size. Youth grants averaged over US$290,OOO, while gender grants (which were second 
in terms of dollar amount disbursed) received an average of less than US$87,OOO. Table 8 














Table 8: Mott Foundation Grants by Chief Issue Addressed250 
Average 
Total Grant 
Funding Size Total 
(in US$) (in US$) Grants 
Sector $14,301,539 $110,865 129 
Democracy $7,709,666 $111,734 69 
Gender $5,740,085 $86,971 66 
Rights $3,997,680 $117,579 34 
Diversity $3,527,477 $100,785 35 
Race $2,648,634 $110,360 24 
Youth $2,622,357 $291,373 9 
Reconciliation $2,129,864 $106,493 20 
Health $1,348,600 $269,720 5 
Other $436,400 $109,100 4 
Volunteer $380,000 $63,333 6 
Adult 
Training $337,086 $125,695 3 
Poverty $300,000 $100,000 3 
Several issues received consistent funding over the period between 1994 and 2005, 
while other issues were confined to a particular time period. Grants addressing gender, 
democracy, diversity, and the non-profit sector received grants steadily over the entire period 
examined. Grants for adult training, health, race relations, and volunteerism, however, were 
clustered around a few years. Adult education grants were only given in the first three years 
after the transition to democracy. Adult education had been a goal of the Mott Foundation 
during apartheid, and this focus was no doubt carried over in the early years of the transition. 
It appears, however, that after 1996 the focus of grants was shifted to more timely issues such 
as health, race relations, and democracy building. Further, grants addressing volunteerism 
were only given between 2000 and 2002. Presumably this was keeping in line with President 
Thabo Mbeki' s declaration of 2002 as the "Year of Volunteerism" in South Africa. Chief 
goals of the funding program in the immediate years following the transition to democracy 
were gender, diversity, and strengthening the non-profit sector. 
Health issues began to be addressed by Mott Foundation grants only in 2001. These 
health grants were largely focused on HIV/AIDS. Only one grant, focused on access to clean 
water, did not include a focus on HIV/AIDS. In total, HIV was mentioned either as the 











Foundation states, its grant program focuses on strengthening civil society, and thus does not 
address HIV/AIDS directly, as do most international donors to South Africa. Rather, to 
address this key challenge, the Foundation focuses on civil society groups that have a positive 
impact on the HIV I AIDS epidemic in the country. The Foundation explains: 
The HIV I AIDS pandemic in South Africa is impossible to ignore. This is not only a 
health issue, but also a serious political, social and economic concern, affecting all sectors 
of society. Given the scale of the problem and the size of the Foundation's resources for 
South Africa, Mott does not have a distinct HIVI AIDS program. Instead, the office 
integrates its involvement with this challenge across all thrce program objectives.25I 
While a variety of issues were addressed through civil society grants from the Mott 
Foundation, a clear priority was placed specifically on strengthening the non-profit sector. 
Conclusion 
The average grantee under the Mott Foundation's South Africa civil society program 
received 2.5 grants for a total of US$116,466 over 51 months of funding. This typical 
organization was based in either Johannesburg or Cape Town and most likely engaged in 
advocacy work for the non-profit sector. With more than US$45 million donated to civil 
society in South Africa's post-apartheid era, the Mott Foundation has no doubt made a 
significant impact on this sector. Funding from this private foundation, however, has not 
followed common trends for civil society funding from official sources. Funding from the 
Foundation remained fairly constant and actually increased during the period, as opposed to 
dropping as occurred with many other donors to South African civil society. 
This organizational profile is in line with the Mott Foundation's stated goals for the 
program. From 1994 through 1997 the Foundation focused on three goals: democracy 
education, women's participation, and strengthening the non-profit sector. Grants made 
during this time period reflects these goals, and a total of 80 percent of the 74 grants made in 
this time period directly focus on one of these three goals. The remainder focus on issues 
such as adult education, reconciliation, and human rights. In 1998, the program was 
refocused around two pillars: the non-profit sector and citizen rights and responsibility. All 
of the 18 grants awarded that year addressed one of these two issues. In 1999 a third pillar -
race and ethnic relations, was added. Since then, grants have addressed the specific goals less 
directly. While the majority of grants given have continued to focus on Mott's main 
objectives, more grants have begun diverging from these specific goals. 











Challenges no doubt remain as Mott continues to focus on South African civil society 
as an important component of the Foundation's work. However, continuing to focus on 












SUCCESSES OF AND CHALLENGES TO 
SOUTH AFRICA'S CIVIL SOCIETY 
An examination of the role of civil society in South Africa's political development 
clearly shows the impact that this sector has had on democratic development. Civil society in 
apartheid-era South Africa was integral in the success of the country's transition to 
democracy in 1994. An assessment of South African civil society shows signs that today's 
civil society is also playing an active role in the consolidation of democracy. Civil society 
groups are working to educate citizens on election regulations and voting rights. Others are 
advocating for citizen participation in local government. More still are encouraging access to 
policy making for more representative legislation. These are activities that promote the 
persistence of a successful democratic state. 
Foreign donors and domestic civil society have been remarkably intertwined 
throughout South Africa's struggle for a multi-racial democracy. From the antiapartheid 
struggle to the effort for a consolidated democracy, international funding has provided the 
necessary means for civil society's participation and survival. Yet, foreign aid's role in 
democracy building remains a relatively new, and still controversial, topic. Increasingly, 
however, studies are pointing to the success of foreign aid as a useful tool to build 
democracy. While a conclusion of this sort is outside the scope of this study, a general trend 
can be observed that many of the civil society organizations key to ushering in democracy did 
recei ve significant amounts of foreign assistance both during and after apartheid. What can 
be concluded from this study is that the sector is robust,252 diverse,253 and highly involved 
. hfi . d 2S4 wit orelgn onors.-
Profile of South African Civil Society 
The kind of civil society groups that developed in South Africa before 1994 emerged 
largely as a result of the politics of apartheid. There was a divide between White civil 
society, which operated primarily with the consent of government and catered to the social 
needs of the White community, and Black civil society, which was largely oppositional in 
2'>2 See Bec Russell and Mark Swilling. "The Size and Scope of the Non-Profit Sector in South Africa," Centre 
for Cil'it Society, 2002. 
25, The Russell and Swilling study also found that civil society in South Africa today address a wide range of 
topics and participate in a vast array of acti vities. 
2'>4 See Institute for Democracy in South Atrica and the Co-operative for Research and Education, "Results of 
An Organizational Survey for a Report on 'The State of Civil Society in South Africa." 2001, 











nature. Despite strict rules regulating the non-profit sector in South Africa during apartheid, 
there emerged a strong, united civil society that operated largely clandestinely within the 
black community. Because many of these groups were banned by the South African 
government, they had to rely largely on foreign funding to continue operations. These 
groups, and thus the foreign donors that supported them, were integral to the end of apartheid 
and the success of the new multi-racial democracy in South Africa. 
With the transition to democracy in the early 1990s, many civil society organizations 
found they had to revise their mission. With the end of apartheid, also came the achievement 
of their goals. They would have to adapt to the new challenges facing the South African 
state. With about 100,000 groups making up the non-profit sector in 1999, however, the civil 
society sector remains inpressively robust in South Africa tOday.255 Civil society also is 
highly diverse. The sector now has the freedom to focus on a large number of issues 
including democracy building, health, economic development, gender equality, and 
education. It is also more representative of South Africa's population today than in the past, 
with 59 percent women workers, and 73 percent Black workers. 256 With a workforce of 
about 650,000 workers and a budget of R9.3 billion in 1999, civil society is a considerable 
force in the South African economy. 
Funding Trends 
Foreign donors supplied the bulk of funding to anti-apartheid civil society groups 
prior to 1990. Because of the clandestine nature of the funding, however, very few records 
are available to measure these funds. What is known, however, is that these donors 
significantly dropped their funding to civil society as South Africa transitioned to a multi-
racial democracy in 1994. Significant funds, primarily from official government sources, 
were redirected from civil society to the new multi-racial government. As democracy 
developed in the country, even the funds that were disbursed to civil society groups were 
largely earmarked for government-civil society partnerships or for supporting civil society 
groups that were working to achieve the social goals of the new ANC government. Civil 
society faced significant challenges as they were forced to cope with this new, less receptive 
funding environment. 
Foreign donors, however, did continue to be significant in providing the funding 
necessary for this sector to function after apartheid ended. As many as 69 percent of civil 
255 Russell and Swilling, 20. 











society organizations III South Africa today receive funding from international donors. 
Almost half of all organizations receive the majority of their funding (51 percent or more) 
from public or private international donors. 257 These figures point to the influence foreign 
donors have over the sector. The importance of continued studies on the impact of this 
foreign donor attention on domestic civil society must be reiterated. 
USAID and the Mott Foundation 
The importance of understanding donor goals and funding trends is necessary to fully 
understand the impact of foreign funding on domestic civil society. This study examined 
these goals and funding trends by examining two case studies. First, this report looked at the 
history, goals, and rationale that motivated one foreign government donor - USAID - as it 
carrying out its civil society program in South Africa. Next, it looked at all civil society 
grants disbursed by one foreign private donor - the Mott Foundation - to determine funding 
trends since the end of apartheid. These two case studies have provided insight into the mind 
of foreign donors and can serve as a base for further study of the field. 
An in-depth look at USAID's involvement in South African civil society found that 
the grants made by this official donor agency were highly influenced by the political 
interactions of the two governments. In the early years of USAID's involvement in South 
Africa, its grantmaking strategy was based almost entirely on goals established for it by 
congressional legislation (the CAAA). This legislation was highly politicized, and the 
funding decisions made by USAID were affected by this political process. South African 
civil society, in particular, was highly affected by this interaction between U.S. grantmaking 
and U.S. policy. In the years prior to 1994 civil society greatly benefited from this closeness, 
as the U.S. government's relationship with the apartheid state deteriorated, and the CAAA 
mandated that no funds go to South African government entities. Later, as the United States 
government sought to establish a relationship with the new South African state, legislation 
was revised, encouraging funding to state institutions. 
As a private organization, the Mott Foundation did not have these political constraints 
on its grantmaking, and thus it was able to continue to focus its funding on civil society even 
after South Africa's transition to democracy. In this way, Mott's South Africa program did 
not follow the traditional pattern for civil society funding in South Africa. While the majority 
257 Institute for Democracy in South Africa and the Co-operative for Research and Education, "Results of An 












of foreign donors have decreased their funding to civil society in the years following 1994, 
the Mott Foundation actually increased its support to civil society since that time. Between 
1994 and 2005, the Foundation supported primarily advocacy, operational, research, 
education, and civic education activities. The primary issue addressed in its grantmaking was 
strengthening the non-profit sector, followed by democracy building, and gender equality. At 
about US$46 million budgeted for these goals over the period examined, the Mott 
Foundation's support was nowhere near that of USAID. However, its support was focused 
enough to make a sizable impact on the 159 organizations that were supported over the 11-
year period. 
Administrative methods of the funding programs also differed between the two 
donors. While both groups started off with similar methods of hands-on locally based 
grantmaking to support individual civil society groups, USAID shifted away from this 
method with the transition to democracy in South Africa. Not only did the Agency begin 
focusing its funding more on government entities, as mentioned previously, but it also began 
to outsource much of the administrative duties of its grantmaking to international and 
domestic intermediaries. The Mott Foundation, on the other hand, continued to run its 
grantmaking program internally out of its domestic office in Johannesburg. 
While civil society programming varied between the two case studies examined in 
terms of strategy, there were several areas in which they were aligned. Both programs put an 
emphasis specifically on strengthening the non-profit sector, as opposed to simply funding 
civil society groups as a means to achieve secondary goals (such as funding a non-profit 
organization to carry out literacy training). Creating an enabling environment for non-profits 
to become financially sustainable within South Africa became a large goal of both USAID 
and the Mott Foundation. Both donors dedicated significant funding to helping the South 
African government reform tax laws for domestic non-profit organizations. Significant 
funding also went to building networks that would help strengthen the sector in the post-
apartheid era. 
There was also considerable overlap in the types of groups funded by both USAID 
and the Mott Foundation. In many cases, both donors funded the same organizations, for 
example IDASA, the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, and Black Sash. 
The civil society organizations that received foreign funding from both USAID and the Mott 
Foundation were primarily urban-based, professional organizations. Very little funding went 











USAID's goals for its civil society program put more emphasis specifically on the 
political functions of the sector, such as its role of government watchdog. The Mott 
Foundation, on the other hand, focused more on funding activities that would encourage 
citizen participation in government - by encouraging racial and gender equality, educating on 
democracy and rights, or building the capacity of the non-profit sector. Despite these 
differences, both USAID and the Mott Foundation have been overtly political in their goals -
they specifically funded non-profit organizations with the overall goal of strengthening 
democracy through a strong civil society. They were not funding bridge clubs or bowling 
leagues, but rather supporting policy think tanks and nonprofit networks. In this way these 
groups encouraged the development of a South African civil society in line with Larry 
Diamond's theory of a politically orientated, pluralistic civil society as the key to 
consolidating democracy, as opposed to a Robert Putnam-influenced theory based on social 
capital as the key to civil society's democratic importance. 
Civil Society's Challenge 
Challenges remain as South Africa's civil society continues to work toward a fully 
consolidated democratic state. The sector was severely weakened after 1994 as considerable 
foreign funding and human capital was redirected from civil society to government and the 
private sector. In addition, the South African government is becoming increasingly hostile 
toward civil society groups that criticize its actions, especially toward those groups that 
receive foreign support. Yet, civil society members must not be thwarted by these setbacks. 
The sector is a necessary component to a functioning democracy, and must remain strong in 
order to not only provide a check on government power, but also to provide an alternative 
outlet for citizen participation in governance. As such, civil society strengthening must 
continue to be a focus not only of international donors, but of domestic donors as well. 
Domestic donors must play an increasing role in the sustainability of the civil society 
sector in South Africa. While government currently provides significant funds to non-profits, 
individuals and local foundations must also become more involved. Civil society groups 
must be funded not only to participate in government partnerships, but in order to create an 
independent sector that does not have to rely on government or foreign donors for 
sustainability. Foreign donors can continue to encourage the creation of such an 
environment, as both the Mott Foundation and USAID have done through their support on 











South Africa's transition to democracy came about through the remarkable effort of a 
wide variety of individuals and groups. International donors and domestic civil society 
worked together to achieve these democracy, and their efforts were realized. Lessons learned 
from the experience of South Africa's civil society and the sector's international donors can 
be applied elsewhere. South Africa's transformation should be an inspiration to other 
developing democracies, and future studies should continue to focus on what has worked to 












Akokpari, John. "The AU, NEP AD and the Promotion of Good Governance in Africa," 
Nordic Journal of African Studies 13(3),2004. pp. 243-263. 
Ally, Russell, South Africa director, Mott Foundation, phone interview by the author, 11 July 
2006. 
Alvarez-Rivera, Manuel. "General Elections in the Republic of South Africa," Election 
Resources on the Internet, <http://electionrcsources.org/zal> (10 June 2006). 
Aurora Associates International, Inc. and Creative Associates International, Inc. "Program 
Evaluation USAID/South Africa: Final Report" 21 April 1995. 
Bratton, Michael. "Civil Society and political transition in Africa" in Civil Society and the 
State in Africa edited by Harbeson et al. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994, ch. 3. 
Brown, Stephen, "Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa," The 
European Journal of Development Research 17:2 (June 2005), pp. 179-198. 
Callaghy, Thomas. "Civil society, Democracy and economic change in Africa: A dissenting 
opinion about resurgent societies" in Civil Society and the State in Africa edited by Harbeson 
et al. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994, ch. 11. 
Camay, Piroshaw and Anne J Gordon. "Civil Society as Advocate of Social Change in Pre-
and Post-transition Societies: Building Sound Governance in South Africa." Institute of 
Development Studies, University of Sussex, 2002. 
<http://w\vw.ids.ac.uklcivsoclfinal/southafricaisafrl.htmi> (19 August 2005). 
Camerer, Lala. 'Terms of Endearment: Bilateral donor engagement in fighting corruption in 
South Africa" African Security Review Vol 9, No. 5/6,2000. 
Carothers, Thomas. "Aiding Democracy Abroad: Lessons from the late 1980s-90s." Global 
Economic Governance Programme: Oxford University. 
<http://users.ox.ac.ukl-ntwoods/challdemocracy.htm> (5 November 2005). 
Carothers, Thomas. "The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion." Foreign Affairs 
Magazine, Marchi April 2006: pp. 55-68 
Carothers, Thomas. 'Think Again: Civil Society." Foreign Policy Magazine, Winter 1999-
2000. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/Civsoc.htm > (19 August 2005). pp. 18-26 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 1986. 
Co-operative for Research and Education and the Institute for Democracy in South Africa. 
"Two Commas and a Full Stop: A Preliminary Report on the Civicus Index on Civil Society 
Project in South Africa." CIVICUS Index on Civil Society Occasional Paper Series 1 :9,2001 











Diamond, Larry, ed. 1997. ConsolidatinR the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and 
Perspectives. Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Diamond, Larry. "Promoting democracy," Foreign Policy Magazine, 87 (Summer 1992): 25-
46. 
Diamond, Larry. "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation," Journal of 
Democracy. Vol 5, 1994: pp. 5-17. 
Ehrenfeld, Daniel. "Foreign Aid Effectiveness, Political Rights and Bilateral Distribution." 
Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. 4 February 2004 <http://www.jha.ac/anicles/aI28.htm> 
(1 May 2006) 
Encarnacion, Omar G. "Beyond Civil Society: Promoting Democracy after September 11." 
Orbis, Fall 2003. 
<http://w\VW .fpri.org/pubs/orbisA 704.encarnacion. beyondci vilsociety .html> (16 August 
2005). 
Finkel, Steven E. "Can Democracy Be Taught?" Journal of Democracy 12:4, October 2003. 
pp. 137 - 151 
Finkel, Steven E, Anibal Perez-Linan, and Mitchell A. Seligson. "Effects of U.S. Foreign 
Assistance on Democracy Building: Results of a Cross-National Quantitative Study," U.S. 
Agency for International Development, 12 January 2006. 
<http://www.usaid.gov/our work/democracy and governance/publications/pdfslimpact of d 
emocracv assistance.pdf> (25 April 2006). 
Gershman, Carl and Michael Allen. "The Assault on Democracy Assistance." Journal of 
Democracy, 17:2, April 2006. pp. 36-51. 
Govender, Charm. "Trends in Civil Society in South Africa today," Umrabulo. December 
2001 <htlp://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pubs/umrabulo/mruabuloI3m.htm!> No. 13. 
Government of South Africa. "Reconstruction and Development Programme," Polity: Policy 
and Law Online News, (1994) <http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/rdp/rdpS.html#S.13> 
5.2.6 (14 June 2006). 
Hearn, Julie, "Aiding democracy? Donors and civil society in South Africa." Third World 
Quarterly, 21:5, 2000: pp. 815-830. 
Hearn, Julie. "Foreign Aid, Democratisation and Civil Society in Africa: A Study of South 
Africa, Ghana and Uganda," Institute of Development Studies Discussion Paper 368. 
Institute for Democracy in South Africa and the Co-operative for Research and Education, 
"Results of An Organizational Survey for a Report on 'The State of Civil Society in South 












Kihato, Caroline. "Shifting sands: The relationship between foreign donors and South 
African civil society during and after apartheid," Centre for Policy Studies Research report no 
86, August 2001. 
Knack, Stephen. "Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?" Center for Institutional Refonn 
and the lnfonnal Sector, Working Paper no 238, September 2000. 
Landsberg, Christopher, "Voicing the Voiceless: Foreign Political Aid to Civil Society in 
South Africa," in Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, eds. 2000. Funding Virtue: Civil 
Society Aid and Democracy Promotion. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
pp.105 - 134. 
Lippman, Hal, Robert Mattes, Julius Nyang'oro, and Robin Silver. "The Transition to 
Sustainable Democracy in South Africa and the Strategic Role of USAID," May 2001. 
Management Systems International, Inc. 
Mandela, Nelson. 1997. Report by the President of the ANC to the 50th National Conference 
of the African National Congress. Mafikeng, South Africa: Speech. 
<http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/speeches/ 1997 Isp 12l6.html> (25 April 2006) 
Manor, James, Mark Robinson and Gordon White. "Civil Society and Governance - A 
Concept Paper." Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 26 August 1999. 
<http://www.ids.ac.uklids/civsoc/> (19 August 2005). 
Masihleho, Nomea, civil society program officer, USAID - South Africa, interview by the 
author, Pretoria, South Africa. 5 July 2006. 
Mattes, Robert, Christiaan Keulder, Annie B Chikwana, Cherrel Africa, and YuU Derek 
Davids. "Democratic Governance in South Africa: The People's View." Afrobarometer Paper 
No. 24, January 2003. <hup://www.afrobarometer.org/papers/AfropaperN024.pdf> 
Mott Foundation. "1998 Annual Report - Civil Society: Developing Philanthropy." Charles 
Stewart Mott Foundation. 
<hup://mott.org/publications/websites/ Annual 1998/developing.html> (8 July 2006). 
Mott Foundation. "1999 Annual Report - Civil Society: South Africa." Charles Stewart Mott 
Foundation. <http://motLorg/publications/websites/ Annuall 999/cs-safrica.asp> (8 July 
2006). 
Mott Foundation. "2004 Annual Report: Reaching Across Boundaries." Charles Stewart Mott 
Foundation. <http://motLorg/puhlications/websites/annuaI2004/> (8 July 2006). 
Mott Foundation. "Civil Society: Philosophy, Programs, and Procedures." Charles Stewart 
Mott Foundation. October 2003 <http://motLorg/publications/pdUP32003CS.pdf> (8 July 
2006). 
Mott Foundation, "Civil Society Program - Frequently Asked Questions," C.S. Mott 











Mott Foundation, "Civil Society Program - South Africa," C.S. Mott Foundation, 
<http://www.mott.or~/pro~rams/cs-sa.asp> (8 July 2006). 
Mott Foundation, "Grants Database," C.S. Mott Foundation, <http://InotLorg/grants.asp> (25 
April 2006). 
National Security Archive, "South Africa: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1962-1989," Digital 
National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.comlsaintro.htm> (13 July 2006). 
Norris, Pippa. 2002. Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
OECD. "Aid Flows top USD 100 billion in 2005" Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development. 4 April 2006, 
<http://www.oecd.org/documentl40/0.2340,en 2649 34447 36418344 1 1 1 I,OO.htm!> 
(10 May 2(06). 
OECD. "South Africa" Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecdJO/6/187874:2.gif> (10 May 2(06). 
Ottaway, Marina and Thomas Carothers, eds. 2000. Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and 
Democracy Promotion. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi. "What 
Makes Democracies Endure?" Journal of Democracy 7(1) January 1996, pp. 39-55. Project 
Muse <http://muse.ihu.edu/journals/journalofdemocracy/v00717.1przeworski.html> (18 
August 2(05). 
Putnam, Robert. "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital." Journal of 
Democracy, 6.1 (1995): 65-78 July 1996. Project Muse 
<http://muse.ihu.edu/journals/journal of democracy/v006/6.1putnam.htm!> (22 August 
2(05). 
Putnam, Robert. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. (1993) 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Reitzes, Maxine and Steven Friedman. "Funding freedom?" Synthesis report on the impact of 
foreign political aid to civil society organizations in South Africa." Centre for Policy Studies 
Research report no 85, June 2001. 
Russell, Bec and Mark Swilling. "The Size and Scope of the Non-Profit Sector in South 
Africa," Centre for Civil Society, 2002. 
Stacey, Simon and Sada Aksartova. "The Foundation of Democracy: U.S. Foundation 
Support for Civil Society in South Africa, 1988-96," Voluntas: International Journal oj" 
Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 12:4, December 2001. 
Smith, Terence, Ismail Davids and Glenn Hollands. Mbeki's Attacks on NGOs Undermine 
Civil Society's Right and Duty to Criticise. Cape Times, 25 October 2005. 











USAID. "About USAID," The United States Agency for International Development 
<http://www.usaid.gov/about usaid/> (3 July 2006) 
USAID. "Country Strategic Plan," USAID South Africa Mission, 
<http://www.lIsaid.gov/missions/sa/uspart2.html> (12 July 2006). 
USAID. "Increased Development of a Politically Active Civil Society," The United States 
Agency for International Development, 
<http://www.lIsaid.gov/our work/democracy and governance/technical areas/civil societyl 
> (3 July 2006) 
USAID. "News Flash: Civil Society Program Design Progress Report," 23 July 2000, The 
United States Agency for International Development - South Africa Mission. Report #5 
<http://www.sn.apc.org/usaidsa/usaidsa/newsDash.pdf> (24 June 2006). 
USAID. "Promoting Democracy and Governance," The United States Agency for 
International Development <http://www.usaid.gov/our work/democracy and governance!> 
(3 July 2006) 
US AID, "South Africa FY 2004 Annual Report," 1 July 2004,3-4. 
<http://pdLdec.org/pdf docs/PDACA045.pdf> (12 July 2006). 
USAID, "South Africa Country Strategic Plan FY 1996-2005," April 1996. 
USAID. "US AID/South Africa Country Strategic Plan Amendment FY 2000 - 2005." 
February 2000. 
USAID. "USAID - South Africa Strategy 1996 - 2007," USAID South Africa Mission, 
<http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstratl2004/23503.htm> (12 July 2006). 
u.S. Department of State and USAID, "FY 2004-2009 Department of State and USAID 
Strategic Plan - Mission," U.S. Department of State, 
<http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstratl2004123503.htm> (12 July 2006). 
White, Glenda, Chris Heymans, Merle Favis, and Jeets Hargovan. "Development Co-
operation Report: Evaluation of ODA to DEMOCRACY and GOOD GOVERNANCE," 
International Organisation Development, June 2000. 
World Bank. "2005 World Development Indicators: Aid dependency" The World Bank 
Group, 2006, <http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdipdfs/table6 1O.pdf> (17 June 2006). 
84 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
